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Résumé 
Le rôle de l'État-nation comme fournisseur de biens publies a été mis à l'épreuve et 
transformé par une série de phénomènes politiques, économiques, sociaux, et 
technologiques. Parmi ceux-ci on retrouve la décentralisation, la globalisation, et les 
changements démographiques. Afin d'y faire face, les États se sont tournés vers des 
organisations supranationales, des gouvernements sous-nationaux, ainsi que des 
acteurs privés. Cependant, le consensus parmi les observateurs intéressés est que 
l'État n'a pas agi en tenant compte de l'impact à long terme de ses actions. 
La raison d'être de cet essai, c'est de mieux comprendre l'opportunité pour l'Etat-
nation de gérer cette transformation de manière moins opportuniste. Celui-ci traite de 
la possibilité d'une approche plus stratégique envers la fourniture des biens publics, 
en rétablissant la prise de décision via la théorie du choix rationnel. Afin de permettre 
une telle approche, nous avons cherché à développer un modèle qui pourrait qualifier 
jusqu'à quel point un État-nation pourrait assurer la fourniture des biens publics. Ce 
modèle tient compte des choix entre les types d'acteurs, ainsi que les différents 
acteurs à travers d'un type donné qui leur sont disponibles. 
À la fin de cette démarche, nous sommes arrivés à trois conclusions qui, selon nous, 
permettront une approche plus stratégique envers la fourniture des biens publics. 
Dans un premier temps, nous avons démontré qu'il était possible de créer un modèle 
qui réunit les différentes alternatives pour la fourniture des biens publies à travers les 
différents types d'acteurs (modèle que nous appellerons marché de la gouvernance.) 
Deuxièmement, à quelques exceptions près, pour un bien public donné, il existe de 
multiples alternatives de fo'urniture pour chaque type d'acteur. Troisièmement, une 
série de critères non-financiers peut être appliqué afin de permettre une production 
plus optimale de ces biens publics. 
Mots-clés: fourniture, état-nation, gouvernance, biens publics, décentralisation, 
Tiebout, fédéralisme fiscal. 
Abstract 
The role of the nation-state as a provider of public goods has been challenged and 
transformed by a range of political, economic, social, and technological phenomena, 
including decentralization, globalization, and demographic change, among many 
others. In attempting to address these challenges, states have turned toward 
supranational organizations, sub-national governments, andprivate actors. However 
the consensus among observers is that the State has not acted with regard to the 
long-term strategie impact of its actions. In fact, it has left itself open to dual loyalties, 
expanding financial commitments, and empire-building by the actors to which it has 
delegated publie goods provision. 
It is the opportunity to manage the transformation of the nation-state less 
opportunistically by re-establishing rational-choice decision-making that provides the 
rationale for this essay, which deals with the scope for a strategie approach to the 
outsourcing of publie goods. To enable such an approach, we have sought to develop 
a framework that evaluates the extent to which nation-states can outsource 
responsibility for the provision of public goods as weil as the choices-among actor 
types and actors of a given type-available to them. 
At the conclusion of this effort, we have three findings that we believe go a long way 
towards enabling a more strategie approach to publie goods outsourcing. First, that it 
is possible to create a coherent framework that captures the options for outsourcing 
public goods provision across actor types. (We cali this a market for governance.) 
Second, with few exceptions, for any given public good, there are multiple alternatives 
for outsourcing within a given actor type. Third, a series of non-financial criteria can 
be applied to enable a more optimal outsourcing of public goods provision. 
Keywords: outsourcing, nation-state, governance, public goods, decentralization, 
Tiebout, fiscal federalism 
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Quotes 
"Modern technology has rendered the nation state obsolete as a principle 
of political organization; for the nation state is no longer able to perform 
what is the elementary function of any political organization: to protect 
the lives of its members and their way of life." 
- Hans Morgenthau, 1966 i 
"The report of my death was an exaggeration." 
- Mark Twain, New Yorkjournal, 1897 ii 
iii 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
During the East-Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the Russian sovereign debt 
default of 1998, nation-states watched helplessly as a process of market-borne 
contagion threatened the economies and financial systems of developed and 
developing countries around the world. 
As the European Union continued to integrate new candidate countries (in 1995, 
2004 and 2007) and further subsume existing member countries, there was a 
parallel push (starting in 1992) known as subsidiarity that led many to wonder 
what future remained for a member state left to its own devices: would Europe 
eventually be simply the European Commission, the European Parliament and a 
series of regions such as Catalonia, Bretagne, Lombardy, and Scotland? 
Finally, the events of September Il, 2001 saw stateless actors lay low-for a 
time-the world's only superpower, further calling into question the continued 
ability of the nation-state to execute on its most basic of responsibilities, the 
provision of public goods such as security. 
The vulnerability of the nation-state can certainly be traced as far back as the 
Treaty of Rome, which laid the groundwork for the European Union, if not earlier. 
ln fact, Morgenthau and others would surely argue that a world of nudear 
weapons, starting with the bornbing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, compromised 
the nation-state even before that. 
This vulnerability is in large measure the result of a hollowing out of the state, 
largely due to the mantra of decentralization, which has seen responsibility for 
the production and delivery of public goods shifted away from central 
governments and doser to the actual consumers of those goods. (However, other 
forces have played a role-in compounding the vulnerability of the state-even 
accelerating it in recent times-something we ~ill explore in depth in Chapter 2.) 
This delegation of the provision of public g06ds has mostly been to the benefit of 
sub-national entities such as regional and local governments, though delegation 
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to supranational and private actors, not to mention state-Ievel, arms-Iength 
entities called 'quangos', has also occurred. 
Decentralization, while appearing to solve a perceived need to bring public goods 
provision closer to consumers-the better to align with local tastes and 
preferences-has created other issues. Not the least of which are dual loyalties, 
expanding financial commitments, and empire-building, ail of which favour local 
government at the expense of central government. 
If we . assume, as Kenneth Waltz (1979) or Robert Gilpin (1981) do, that the 
nation-state is a rational actor, we can assume that it would not deliberately work 
to undermine its long-term interests and put itself in a position of vulnerability. 
That the nation-state is in just such a situation of vulnerability implies either that 
it didn't act rationally or that, at a minimum, it didn't act with regard to the long-
term strategie impact of its actions. In fact, observers claim that the nation-state 
has been distinctly lacking in this regard. 
Historical background 
It is generally agreed that the nation-state came into being as a result of the 
1648 Peace of Westphalia. The resulting 'Westphalian system' defined the state-
a unique autonomous entity with complete sovereignty over the land, resources, 
people and activities that occur on its territory-as the basic unit of analysis in 
international relations. 
The nation-state was active externally, where it had the power to make war and 
initiate treaties with other states, and internally, where its activities consisted of 
the production and delivery of public goods, essentially the public services such 
as healthcare, education and infrastructure that we know today. 
The earliest public good to be provided by the State was most probably the 
provision of public security, more accurately publie order, the subject of Thomas 
Hobbes' 1651 treatise on government, "Leviathan"iii. As far back as the Greek 
polis, in return for a monopoly on the use of force, the State agreed to protect its 
citizens, promising to take action against those-both inside and outside the 
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State-who would threaten it. Looking back to the time of the Roman Empire, we 
see the emergence of other public goods, such as infrastructure, specifically, the 
development of roadways and waterworks for the benefit of the population at 
large. 
ln more contemporary times, we find Louis XIV in 1676 providing a home for 
elderly and sick soldiers at Paris' Hôpital des Invalides. Between 1883-1888, we 
see the beginnings of the welfare state resulting from Prussian chancellor 
Bismarck's decision to provide national health insurance and compulsory old-age 
insu rance in return for employer and worker contributionsiv • While modern 
income tax was initially the result of the need to pay for war efforts (the 
Napoleonic Wars, the United States Civil WarV), it continued to be levied after 
those conflicts, in return for which the state provided additional services to 
citizens. 
Following the great stock market crash of 1929, and the worldwide recession that 
ensued, states were compelled to introduce new public goods, such as 
unemployment insurance and welfare benefit payments, to the most 
downtrodden. Emblematic of these is Franklin D. Roosevelt's package of 
programs from 1933 through to 1938 known as the New Deal, which was 
designed to provide relief to the American population in the wake of the Great 
Depression. 
Notwithstanding the increasing role of the State during this time, it is important 
to note the role played by non-state actors in public goods provision. Oliver 
Volckart (2000:267) reminds us of the development of private organizations in 
the Middle Ages designed to provide public goods. These included corporations, 
which were created to provide a measure of public and legal security for their 
members, and guilds, which were designed to ensure a minimum level of welfare 
for members by regulating economic activity. As the European colonial powers 
began to expand outside of the Old Continent and into the New World, the Roman 
Catholic Church played an important role in providing education, healthcare and 
other social services to the newly migrated and their families, as weil as the 
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indigent peoples and, in the centuries that followed, the descendants of both 
groups. 
That the State would eventually take over responsibility for these public goods, 
while adding new ones, could only occur via the development of its own 
capabilities to centralize public goods production. Michael Mann (1997:476) 
provides some perspective on this dynamic over time: 
"The regulatory powers of such states expanded through several 
centuries. First, from the end of the Middle Ages they increasingly 
plausibly claimed a monopoly of judicial regulation and military 
force. Then, in the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth 
centuries they sponsored integrating communications 
infrastructures and basic control of the poor. The twentieth century 
saw welfare states, macroeconomic planning and the mobilization of 
mass citizen nationalism." 
Relevance 
While a long process of centralization resulted in public goods being largely, if 
not exclusively, provided by the State in the hundred years following the Peace of 
Westphalia, the role of the nation-state as the principal provider of public goods 
has since been challenged by a range of political, economic, social, and 
technological phenomenavi , relegating it in many cases to a role of publie goods 
coordinator. 
The signing of the International Telegraph Conventionvii by twenty countries in 
May 1865 created the first of a series of international organizations and 
supranational institutions favouring collaboration between states on matters such 
as the coordination of technical norms or the definition of condoned inter-state 
behaviours. More than 140 years later, a wide number of 'traditional' 
responsibilities and policy domains of the state-trade, health, defence, justice, 
fiscal policy, currency, and monetary policy, among many others-are covered by 
such organizations and institutions, transforming what were essentially national 
'public goods' into a series of global 'collective goods' in the process. While each 
individual signatory state maintains overall domestic accountability for the public 
good in question, the day-to-day development, coordination, and in many cases, 
5 
execution of that good are the domain of the particular supranational 
organization. 
The phenomenon of delegating responsibility for the design, production ~.nd 
delivery of publie goods to a supranational organization has been joined by a 
l ' , ' 
second more powerful one: delegation to sub-national entities. This is captured 
under the broad term of 'decentralization', but is sometimes known as 
devolution. Though decentralization has an even longer history than that of 
centralization to supranational organizations-Flinders (2004:884) notes the 
creation of independent agencies in the UK starting as far back as the 17th 
centuryviii_its intensity has increased significantly over the last fifty years as 
states have sought to better align the provision of publie goods with the 
preferences of consumers by moving their production and delivery doser to the 
local level. This movement was influenced in large part by the work of Charles 
Tiebout, who in 1956 made the case that devolution of responsibilities and 
associated resources to lower levels of government could significantly improve 
the quality of services provided. Annex 1 provides some idea of the potential 
scope for sub-national delegation with a list of sub-national entities created in 
Britain between 1997 and 2004. 
However, the dynamic of pushing from the centre outwards that decentralization 
represents has been replaced by a more powerful one: pu/ling in the form of 
active pressure from sub-national governments in the context of separatist or 
nationalist movements. Examples of this range from the piece-meal, negotiated 
approaches taken by the Canadian province of Quebec or the Spanish state of 
Catalonia over a period of decades to the outright one-off devolution of a wide 
range of responsibilities to the assernblies of Scot land and Wales by the British 
government of Tony Blair in 1997. 
A third source of change has been a combination of economic, technological and 
societal phenomena that have further expanded the scope for delegation of 
responsibility for public goods to private, non-state actors. Information and 
communication technologies, including cheap computing power and computer 
networks, as weil as business phenomena such as outsourcing have 
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demonstrated their awesome power to transform the delivery of publie goods 
both in times ofwar and in times of peace. In fact, this ability became a major 
political issue in the 2004 United States presidential election. 
ln the àggregate, though the means by which publie goods provision has been 
delegated have been mostly happenstance, driven more by political expediency 
than any conscious, well-thought out, strategie, long-term design. As Bache and 
Flinders (2004:36) note, "In the context of these developments, there has been 
little long-term strategie thinking regarding the steering capacity of the centre." 
Project 
The impetus for this project was brought about by two newspaper articles as weil 
as an element specifie to the United States' ongoing occupation of Iraq. The first 
article, dated November 13th, 2003, was an editorial in The Economist titled, 
"Europe's rebellious regions", on the occasion of the retirement of Jordi Pujol, the 
man responsible for much of the success of Catalonia in its push for self-
government. The article stated however that, 
"What happens in Catalonia is of more than local interest. Europe's 
nation-states are being challenged from above, by the growing 
powers of the supranational European Union, but also from below, 
by increasingly assertive regions. Some theorists talk of a new 
layering of power in Europe .... This symmetrical squeeze on the 
nation-state sounds appealingly neat in theory. But, as the 
controversies in Catalonia show, the reality can be a lot messier. 
Across Europe, governments and regions still squabble over how 
power should be distributed."ix 
The second was a March 2006 article in The Economist entitled "Self-replicating", 
which dealt with a proposai by Singapore to 'manage' one of the thousands of 
islands that make up Indonesia. In discussing the desire by Singaporean 
authorities to essentially 'clone' their city-state, providing administration 
expertise and a proven legal system in return for land and the opportunities it 
afforded for economic growth, it became apparent that this pushed the logic of 
outsourcing public goods to its logical extreme. What was left was essentially an 
expertise that could be implanted anywhere-something The Economist called 
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the "Singaporean operating system"X-with 'investors' providing the land, people, 
and resources. 
The third impetus was the explosion in the number of Private Military Contractors 
(PMCs) on the ground in Iraq and the roie that these private actors played in 
relieving the United States' military of a number of its responsibilities on the 
ground. The US military had essentially outsourced activities historically 
associated with national army-driven war fighting to these PMCs. The employees 
of these military contractors, in return for working with less stringent rules of 
engagement and less formai recourse for assistance, found themselves making 
much more money than if they had been there as soldiers under the flag. While 
military contractors equipped with dark sunglasses and automatic weapons had 
mostly been seen protecting American diplomats, the May 5th , 2004, killings of 
four employees of Blackwater USA, an American PMC, in the Iraqi town of Fallujah 
brought home just how close to the action these PMCs actually were. 
Theoretical framework 
John Lewis Gaddis (1999) asks, "States are not likely to disappear in the near 
future, and it is reasonable to expect that they will still be around in some form 
when the twenty-first century ends. The question is, 'In what form?''' 
Attempting to answer Gaddis' question, 'in what form', we will take the continued 
existence of the nation-state as a given as weil as the continued delegation of 
some form of public goods provision. Instead, it is the challenges that the nation-
state continues to face and the ability to manage the transformation less 
opportunistically that provide the backdrop for this essay, which deals with the 
scope for a strategie approach to the outsourcing of publie goods. This is 
something that is currently lacking in the literature, and that we believe provides 
tremendous value going forward. 
To enable such an approach, we seek to develop a framework that will evaluate 
the extent to which nation-states can outsource responsibility for the provision of 
publie goods as weil as the choices-among actor types and actors of a given 
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type-available to them. To encourage the re-establishment of rational-choice 
decision-making, this framework will also propose a series of criteria for 
evaluating the relative attractivenessand potential consequences of a given 
course of action .. 
We expect that the eventual transformation of this organizing perspective into a 
more formai model or eventually a theory would be the subject of future study. 
Units of analysis 
When considering the decision to delegate the design, production and delivery of 
publie goods, we would normally assume the operation of some level of rational 
choice decisiôn-making in the form of a financially-based opportunity cost 
analysis or a cost-benefit analysis. However, as indicated earlier, the piece-meal 
approach to publie goods delegation seen to date has left the nation-state more 
vulnerable than ever, and has been described by observers as lacking in strategie 
approach, causing us to question the level of rationality in operation. xi 
. While public goods may ultimately have other benefits, they are essentially 
economic services by nature. They are produced by financial means and thus 
have a notion of intrinsic value. This should simplify the ability to compare them 
with other public goods and their methods of provision on at least one level. 
However, in formulating criteria for evalLiating the respective options for 
outsourcing public goods provision, we will also consider goods in terms of their 
utility, a second approach that favours comparison between one or more 
heterogeneous goods whose benefits cannot so easily be measured in monetary 
terms. In this case, we will provide criteria for determining utility based on the 
potential impact from spillovers, usually conceived in terms of positive 
externalities, and the potential dynamics resulting from the principal-agent 
relationship between the State and the non-state actor(s) providing the 
outsourced goods. 
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Findings 
We have three findings. First, that it is possible to create a coherent framework 
that captures the options for outsourcing public goods provision across actor 
types: the nation-state (including quangos); supranational organizations; sub-
national entities, and private actors. (We cali this a market for governance.) 
Second, with few exceptions, for any given public good, there are multiple 
alternatives for outsourcing within a given actor type. Third, a series of non-
financial criteria can be applied to enable a more strategie approach to the 
question of delegation of publie goods provision. 
Demonstration 
ln Chapter 2, we will consider the forces transforming the provision of public 
goods, as weil as the new forms of governance driven by them. In Chapter 3, we 
will put forward our proposed framework for the provision of public goods. We 
will then apply it to three states in Chapter 4 before concluding and considering 
future avenues for study in Chapter 5. 
Terminology 
Before proceeding, we shall provide clarification on the terms we shall use in the 
course of this document. 
When referring to a collection of citizens at the sub-national level sharing a 
common language, culture or otherwise separate from the majority, we will use 
the term 'people', as in the Catalan people, when not simply using their 
respective collective nomenclature such as we find for the Scots or the Quebecois. 
To avoid any misinterpretation with our source material, we will reserve the term 
'nation' for use as described in the next paragraph. 
We shall use the terms 'nation', 'state', 'State', and 'country' interchangeably 
when referring to the nation-state. Mann (1997:476) defines the nation-state as 
"claiming formai political sovereignty over "its' territories and a legitimacy based 
on the 'people' or 'nation' [people] inhabiting them." We will consider in 
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particular those states that have voting rights at the top level of world bodies 
such as the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, which enables us to 
occasionally include entities such as Taiwan, but not necessarily Scotland, Quebec 
or Catalonia, to name but a few. We shall also use the terms 'supranational' and 
'supernational' interchangeably when referring to international governmental 
organizations. 
When discussing publie goods, we shall defer to Paul Samuelson (1954:387) who 
describes them as "[goods] which ail enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual's consumption of that good ... " Alternatively known as 'collective 
consumption goods' or 'pure' public goods, Johnson (2005) adds that they are, 
"A very special class of goods which cannot practically be withheld 
from one individual consumer without withholding them from ail 
(the 'nonexcludability criterion') and for which the marginal cost of 
an additional person consuming them, once they have been 
produced, is zero (the 'nonrivalrous consumption' criterion)".Xii 
Further clarifying the notion, Charles Tiebout (1956:417) adds that, "A definition 
alternative to Samuelson's might be simply that a public good is one which 
should be produced, but for which there is no feasible method of charging the 
consumers." 
We are specifically interested in those public goods that benefit the citizens or 
businesses located within the territory of the State. These range from physical 
goods and services that can be directly consumed by citizens or businesses, to 
more abstract legal and administrative frameworks that govern specifie economic 
activities or geographical areas (e.g., waterways and resource extraction, among 
others). 
We shall also refer to goods that possess public good-like qualities. For as we 
shall see, many of the goods in question can be more fairly described as 
collective goods, global public goods, or quasi-public goods when delivered by a 
non-state actor though distributed over a large population and meeting the 
criteria of nonexcludability and nonrivalrous consumption. 
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We define 'congestible' goods as those goods that become congested as more 
citizens or households make use of them (lnman and Rubinfeld 1997). These can 
also be thought of as impure goods that are tivalrous in nature. Wilcoxen (2003) 
explains the dynamic behind cbrigestible goods as, "Once [aJ good becomes 
congested, ... each additional user imposes external costs on ail the other users. 
Since each additional user does not pay the full marginal cost of his or her 
decision, the resource becomes overused." 
We shall use Alberto Alesina's (2003:307) definition of government as "a term 
meant to capture a bundle of public goods and policies." As for the notion of 
governance, we shall start with its definition by Bache and Flinders (2004:35), for 
whom, 
"In broad terms, 'governance' describes the increased participation of 
nongovernmental actors in public policy-making and delivery. The 
term is used to imply an appreciation of an increasingly complex 
state-society relationship in which network actors are prominent in 
policy-making and the state's primary role is policy co-ordination 
rather than direct policy control." 
To the notion of policy-coordination, which we shall interpret as strategy and 
execution, we shall add that of the actual production and delivery of public goods 
to generate what we cali governance. To provide additional perspective on this 
idea, Allen Schick (2003:94-95) writes that governance "has supplanted 
"government" in many discussions of political institutions and public policy". Eva 
Sorensen (2003:6) describes the transition from government to governance as 
"the spreading of governing capacity to relatively autonomous public institutions 
and to networks of publie and private actors." Hill and Lynn (2005: 1) write that, 
"The growing acceptance of 'governance' as an organizing concept 
for public management reform reflects a widespread, though not 
universal, belief that the focus of administrative practice is shifting 
from hierarchical government toward greater reliance on horizontal, 
hyb ri d i ze d. and éI.$ 50 ci ;:\1"! '.1 11:~ ~ 'Ye, ,~',"n::: ()f L;\J"If~ 1'1: 2n::E.,," 
(ommenting on the notion of qov.:,-nancE, a '/\ioni that has beCOi"'n0 much more 
commonplace in day-to-day discussions of accountability in general, and 
government in particular, Schick (2003:94-95) adds that it suggests, "that 
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tinkering with the machinery of government through civil service reform, budget 
practices and administrative re-organisation-the stuff of publie management 
during the pa st century-does not offer sufficient improvement in performance." 
Lester H. Salamon uses the terms "third-party government" (1997) and R.A.W. 
Rhodes (1996) uses the term "the new governance" to essentially capture the 
same dynamic. 
When discussing "utility", we mean to use it in the tradition of the field of 
economics where it is understood as, "a measure of the relative satisfaction or 
desiredness from consumption of goods. Given this measure, one may speak 
meaningfully of increasing or decreasing utility, and thereby explain economic 
behavior in terms of attempts to increase one's utility."xiii We will specifically focus 
on the notion of 'desiredness' to be exact. Though it is citizens who are the 
ultimate consumers of the goods, it is the State that is ultimately accountable to 
the population for their delivery. Therefore a qualitative, utility-friendly dynamic 
is at work. 
Finally, we define outsourcing as "utilizing experts from outside the entity to 
perform specifie tasks that the entity once performed itself."xiv Outsourcing has 
been pursued in the private sector essentially for strategie reasons. It is widely 
considered a valid, cost-effective means of enhancing value for money and so we 
use the term here dispassionately. We cali the ability to delegate the provision of 
publie goods 'outsourcing' as weil since, political opportunism aside, this is 
essentially what is going on: someone other than the State is responsible for the 
design, production and delivery of a good formerly produced by the State. 
Referring to outsourcing in security matters, Krahmann (2003:4) uses the term 
'public private partnerships', which can range from, 
" ... The outsourcing of single functions or entire service sectors to 
joint ventures and fully government-owned private companies. Each 
type of public private partnership is associated with different forms 
and levels of governmental control. Whereas outsourcing provides 
supervision through commercial contracts,joint ventures and 
shareholdership directly involve governments in the provision of 
publie services." 
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The term outsourcing has been used most frequently in a political science 
context at the level of individual public goods. For example, Krahmann (2003), in 
the context of the UK and German militaries •. and Singer (2005) both talk about 
the 'outsourcing' of defence or active combat by parties to conflicts as varied as 
the wars of the 19905 in the Balkans and the Congo and the 2003 war in and 
continuing occupation of Iraq. 
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Chapter 2: Literature 
The concept of outsourcing the nation-state-the term we propose to describe 
the strategie delegation of the provision of public goods-takes place in the 
context of a long-standing debate on the futu re of the nation-state itself. As 
Peter Drucker (1997: 159) noted, for a variety of reasons, " ... The best and the 
brightest have been predicting the nation-state's demise for 200 years, 
beginning with Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay, 'Perpetuai Peace'." It is a debate 
that has nonetheless intensified in recent years. However, taking the continued 
existence of the nation-state as a given, let us now turn our attention to the 
forces that are converging to transform the State and publie goods provision, as 
weil as the new forms of governance driven by them. 
Forces transforming the nation-state 
Writing in 1966, Hans Morgenthau stated, "the modern technologies of 
transportation, communications, and warfare, and the resultant feasibility of all-
out atomic war, have completely destroyed [the] protective function of the nation 
state."xv Echoing Morgenthau nearly thirty years later, in the context of the end of 
the Cold War, Michael Mann (1997:473) writes that four theses, many leveraging 
the power, availability and affordability of communications technologies and 
international travel, have been put forward to justify the (continued) weakening of 
the nation-state. To paraphrase Mann, they are: 
1) Globalization, which is undermining the nation-state's ability to plan, 
protect or provide for its citizens; 
2) Global threats, such as terrorism, environ mental or population-based, 
which do not respect borders; 
3) Identity politics and new social movements; and 
4) Post-nuclearism, which undermines state sovereignty and other forms 
of hard politics. 
As John Ikenberry (2008:31) writes, "In the age of nuclear deterrence, great power 
war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven 
change has been abolished as a historical process." Consequently, we shall ignore 
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point #4. Instead, building on Mann's first three pointsxvi , we will consider the 
following forces that are transforming the nation-state: 
• Decentralization 
• Globalization of the economy; 
• Demographie change;· .. 
• Management theory; 
• Accelerated technological change; 
• The increase in the number and scope of supranational organizations; 
• The trend towards the delegation of powers to sub-national 
governments; and 
• The continued growth in the number, size and scope of private actors: 
Decentrai ization 
Among the many forces transforrning the nation-state, one could argue that it is 
decentralization that has played the most important role. The basic idea behind 
decentralization was effectively captured in Charles Tiebout's landmark 1956 
treatise, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures'. Building on Friedrich Hayek's idea 
that "local governments and consumers have better information than the national 
government about local conditions and preferences" (Qian and Wiengast 
1997:83), Tiebout argued that the quality of government services would be 
improved as responsibility for the production and delivery of public goods-and 
associated financial resources-was moved closer to the ultimate consumers of 
those goods. The level of government closest to the consumer-whether state, 
provincial or local government-was perceived as best placed to both understand 
and arbitrate between consumer preferences. 
By moving the provisioning of public goods down to a lower level where multiple 
potential providers existed, it also created the possibility of competition between 
providers, which if the market analogy held, would result in more 'bang for the 
buck'. According to Donahue (1997:74), 
"Diverse policy regimes can cater to heterogeneous preferences and 
accommodate varying conditions. Collective choices are less error-
prone, and public administration less plagued by agency problems, 
with a smaller polit Y and simpler policy agenda. Interstate 
competition can discipline government, augmenting the 'voice' of 
the ballot box with the 'exit' of mobility." 
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And like with any competitive market for goods or services, unsatisfied 
'consumers' could vote with their feet and take their 'business' to the next best 
provider. As Donahue (1997:73) writes fort y years after Tiebout's land mark 
article, 
"Decentralization and interjurisdictional mobility gives the individual 
power over government that can be exercised on the citizens' terms, 
at the citizens' own initiative, at any time. If public authority is 
pushed down to levels where choice and competition can operate, 
every citizen can stage a personal revolution armed with only a 
moving van." 
However, decentralization was not without its critics. Inman and Rubinfeld 
(1997:46) write that, 
"In the Tiebout economy, most public services are assumed to be 
congestible and efficiently provided by small communities. 
However, when there are significant intercommunity 
interdependencies (like pure public goods or spillovers), Tiebout's 
competition among small governments may result in economically 
inefficient public policies .... The principle of economic federalism 
assigns the central government the task of correcting such 
misallocations." 
ln his 1972 book of the same name, Wallace Oates introduced the term 'fiscal 
federalism' to describe a vision of decentralization that maintained a role for the 
central government not only as the entity tasked with collecting taxes and 
redistributing them to the regions. In essence, fiscal federalism says that 
responsibilities-and funds-should be transferred to the level of government 
where the externalities can best be generated and captured, even if this remains 
the central government. Aiso known as economic federalism, fiscal federalism has 
had considerable impact on subsequent thinking about the merits of 
decentralization and its effects. For Inman and Rubinfeld (1997:53), economic 
federalism embraces "the logic of the Tiebout model and the use of lower-tier 
governments to provide congestible public services." Inman and Rubinfeld 
(1997:47) providesome context: 
"For most economists, the principle of economic federalism, with its 
recommended institutions of competitive decentralized local 
governments and a strong central government to provide pure 
public goods and control intercommunity externalities, essentially 
defines what federalism is about." 
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Another way of understanding the drive to decentralize is to shift the discussion 
away from the question of local tastes, to instead focus on the notion of 
externalities. As Inman and Rubinfeld note above, this is captured by the 
discussion of pure publie goods-which respect the criteria of 'nonexcludability' 
and 'nonrivalrous consumption'-and impure public goods, which do not. Inman 
and Rubinfeld (1997:45) provide sorne perspective on the recommended 
separation of responsibilities: 
"When public services are pure publie goods for which the marginal 
cost of adding another user will be zero (national defense, basic 
research), or when there are inefficiencies arising from externalities 
across jurisdictions, then under economic federalism the central 
government will be assigned responsibility for those services. 
However, for public services that become congested as more 
households use the service-that is, to accommodate additional 
households at current service levels, additional public facilities must 
be provided-then relatively small communities are more likely to 
provide the service efficiently." 
As we have seen, and will discuss further in depth later in this chapter, 
decentralization has mostly been in the direction of sub-national governments, 
with its attendant costs in terms of dual loyalties, expanding fiscal commitments 
and hubris, ail characteristic of principal-agent relationships. As a result, 
decentralization for the sake of decentralization alone had become problematic. 
Donahue (1997:75) writes, 
"In principle, a custom-tailored government should be matched to 
each collective purpose. But the co st of forming, maintaining, and 
restructuring polities is often high, and governmental mergers, 
spin-offs, and liquidations tend to be more traumatic transactions 
th an their private sector analogues. Thus the number and 
configuration of publie sector entities have more to do with the 
accidents of a capricious history than with the shifting dictates of 
economic rationality." 
ln addition, by creating enhanced responsibilities and visibility for specifie sub-
regions of a country, potentially enhancing independence movements in the 
process, decentralization is antithetical to the long-term interests of the State. 
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Consequently, a separate type of decentralization has also occurred, in the form 
of state-sponsored, quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations (known 
as quangos in government jargon). These initially promised to bring some of the 
benefits of decentralization-a focuson the specifie needs of a constituency or 
geography (something that is difficult at the central level)-while avoiding or 
minimizing challenges specifie to principal-agent relationships and preserving 
the overall prerogative of the State. 
However, as Flinders (2004a:884) writes, the principal drawback of quangos is 
that they "are neither responsible nor directly responsive to the vote of the 
people." (Thus irrespective of the intentions of their designers, quangos exhibit 
some of the challenges inherent with principal-agent relationships.) Regarding 
the British experience with quangos, Flinders (2004a:883) writes that, "[the] 
process has been largely devoid of an underpinning rationale and this may have 
significant implications for successful policy delivery, the public's trust in 
government and the future trajectory of the British state." This echoes Bache and 
Flinders' critique of the lack of a strategie approach that we saw earlier. 
While a powerful force unto itself, decentralization has gotten only so far on the 
strength of its rationale. That decentralization-seen in the broadest sense 
possible as the delegation of responsibility for the provision of public goods-has 
continued to expand over time in scope is due to other forces, such as economies 
of scale due to new technologies, globalization, demographic ch;:lnge, and others 
that have carried it forward. We shall now proceed to examine those forces. 
Globalization of the economy 
Globalization in the early twenty-first century is characterized by relatively liberal 
flows of people, goods and capital, at least when compared with the 100 years 
between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twenty-first. 
Niall Ferguson (2006:1) writes, "The world of 1900 was in many ways as 
globaUzed as our own. Markets for goods, labor, and capital were as integrated 
as never before. Men and women had never mingled so freely as they did in cities 
like London, Berlin and Shanghai." This level of globalization was to be 
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compromised for at least the next fifty years, starting with the first Sino-Japanese 
war of 1895 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904xvii and extending into the early 
years of the Cold War. 
According to Mann (1997:478-79), two great geopolitical events eventually set 
globalization back on its path: "First, decolonization largely ended the 
segmentation of the world economy into separate imperial zones. Second, the 
collapse of Soviet autarchy opened up most of Eurasia to capitalist penetration." 
Globalization in 2007 is symbolized by corporations with operations on ail 
continents except Antarctica and annual revenues surpassing the combined gross 
domestic product (GDP) of most African countries; 24-hour, largely control-free, 
worldwide capital markets; and a growing cadre of white collar and blue collar 
workers crossing borders to ply their trade for a few years before returning home 
(and starting their own businesses). 
Globalization has been perceived for a number of years as the most pote nt threat 
to the ability of the nation-state to pursue its policies on the domestic front and 
to react to external events in line with the wishes of its citizens. Casella and 
Weingast (1995: 13) would say that this challenge to· the nation-state by 
globalization makes perfect sense. In fact, as they see it, "the 'nested,' 
hierarchical structure of the nation-state has no obvious economic rationale and 
is opposed by economic forces." Alesina et al (2001:3) attribute to globalization a 
major responsibility for the changes to the form and viability of the nation-state 
as we knew it. They write that "the increasing integration of the world economy is 
(at least in part) responsible" for both the growing clout and responsibilities of 
supra-national unions and the push by sub-national actors for additional powers 
and resources. These parallel to a certain extent Mann's first and third theses. 
Alesina et al. (2001:41) go on to qualify these as centrifugai and centripetal 
forces, with centrifugai forces as pushes for "regional autonomy in most West 
European countries and the break-up of some Eastern European nations)" and 
centripetal forces as "the tendency to delegate policies to supernational entities 
like the European Union." 
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Demographie change 
Going forward, one of the challenges facing most Western coù ntries is that a 
significant portion of their active population will be leaving the workforce. Tens 
of millions of members of the baby boom generation-a generation that was 
significantly outsized relative to both its predecessor and successor 
generations-are expected to retire in the next ten to fifteen years. The inability 
to replace them in equal numbers will put additional pressure on a system being 
asked to look after retirees as they enter the most costly phase of their lives (e.g., 
old age pensions, healthcare, etc.). 
While automation technology and more competitive com·pensation and recruiting 
from the private sector can be expected to pick up some of the slack, it is quite 
likely that the ability of Western governments to return to business as usual is 
forever compromised. This puts additional impetus behind the drive to outsource 
many of the tasks performed today by the publie service, but with a catch. It is 
worth noting that this trend of outsourcing towards private actors by pure 
logistical necessity is over and above the trend towards outsourcing them on the 
basis of their economic (read technological) merits alone, something we will 
discuss later in this section. 
Management theory 
A third force for change in the organization of the nation-state comes from the 
world of management theory. Two notions-focus at the firm level and 
specialization at the portfolio level-have had an outsized impact on 
management practice in the private sector. As Alan Schick (2003:94-95) writes, it 
started almost a generation age: 
"Decentralisation is part of a broader strategy to divest national 
governments of direct responsibility for delivering services. The 
main roots of this strategy can be traced to an influential [1969] 
article "The Sickness of Government" by management guru Peter 
Drucker a generation ago. Arguing that national governments are 
inherently inept providers of services, Drucker urged that they 
should focus on policy rather than services-they should steer and 
leave the rowing to others." 
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Writing over twenty years after Drucker's article and echoing his line of thinking, 
C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel introduced the business world to the notion of core 
competencies. As Prahalad and· Hamel (1990:81) saw it, competitiveness 
depended on "management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies 
and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to 
adapt quickly to changing opportunities." 
By focusing on the essential or the 'core', organizations were ensuring their 
ability to adapt to, to react to and to take advantage of change. The core 
competencies concept invited organizations to essentially re-evaluate the 'how' 
and the 'why' they were in business by asking themselves, "what are we good at?" 
and "what exactly is it that we do?". We see the evolution of this line of thinking 
in the political realm at the level of the European Union in a 2001 white paper on 
governance, which discusses the notion of a 'core mission'. 
"Reforming European governance implies that the Commission must 
refocus on its core mission. The proposais in this paper will improve 
the quality of the way it initiates policy. They will ensure more 
clarity and effectiveness in policy execution, and maximise the 
impact of the Commission's actions as guardian of the Treaty [of 
Rome]." (CEC 2001:8) 
The second powerful idea that transformed management practice came from the 
world of (financial) portfolio management theory. The push in the 1980s and 
1990s to undo the business conglomerates that were so prevalent through the 
1960s and 1970s-organizations such as ITT, Gulf & Western Industries, and 
Hanson PLC come to mind-was due in large part to a re-evaluation of 
assumptions concerning potential gains from the diversification of risk. 
Conventional wisdom prior to that time was that an organization could hedge 
against or reduce risk in one part of its operations by purchasing a second 
organization that was subject to a different business cycle or different 
geographical risk~ However this eventually came at a priee: the shares of 
conglomerates were historically undervalued when compared to those of their 
stock market peers. This meant that the desired diversification of risk was 
coming at the expense of investor returns. 
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ln a highly cited article, Bettis (1983) explained that individual investors could 
create their own hedges by investing in different companies on their own, with 
none of the discounts associated with conglomerates. Following this line of 
thinking, manyconglomerates would eventually seek to break up their operations 
in order to eliminate this discount, essentially becoming specialized 'pure play' 
providers in the process-best of breed organizations focused on a single line of 
business. 
Over and above the worldwide wave of privatizations in the 1980s and 1990s, 
this approach of firm-Ievel focus and portfolio-Ievel specialization-backed by 
management and financial theory-finds its public sector equal in a re-evaluation 
of those activities in which the nation-state should be present and those that it 
could conceivably delegate to others. This is captured in the notion of 'The 
Performing State'. According to Allen Schick (2003:75), the prototypical 
performing state, 
" ... continuously reads its environment and adjusts how and what it 
does in response to new information. In the same way that a 
successful firm thrives by monitoring its market and changing its 
product mix, priees and other policies in response to changes in 
consumer preferences, technological developments and the 
entrance (or exit) of competitors, an effective government 
transforms itself in response to changes in family patterns, income 
distribution, technological advances and other opportunities. Of 
course, government has a more difficult time adapting because it 
lacks the pressure provided by markets and the signais supplied by 
priees. Yet, performing governments do change, even when they 
profess to be staying the same." 
The performing state is inherently a private sector management concept-notice 
Schick's reference to the 'successful firm'-in that it is uniquely focused on the 
notion of outputs or 'desired outcomes'. This last term somewhat dryly strips 
away the qualitative aspects of publie goods delivery to focus attention on more 
quantifiable 'yes/ no' type questions such as "did we do we do what we said we 
would do?" or "did we achieve what we set out to do?". Schick (2003:73) notes 
that, 
"The basic idea is that government should deliver efficient services 
and operate efficient programmes. In the burgeoning literature on 
performance, efficiency generally is associated with outputs-the 
goods and services produced by government-and effectiveness 
with outcomes-the impacts of government programmes on society. 
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One of the initial responses to the need to become a performing state was via the 
transformation of the civil service, captured under the catchall term 'New Public 
Management' (NPM), initially developed in the 1980s and much refined since 
then. Schick (2003:86) writes that NPM, 
" ... favours 'shock therapy', stripping away operations and service 
delivery from integrated departments and entrusting them to free-
standing agencies that have broad operating freedom, privatising 
government activities or introducing market-type arrangements 
within governments such as competition, priees and internai 
contracts." 
According to Bache and Flinders (2004:46), "A central goal of NPM was to move to 
a situation in which ministers 'steered but did not row ' and therefore moved from 
direct governing to indirect governance." Shamsul Haque (2001:65) provides 
some perspective on the worldwide scope of this phenomenon: 
"The examples of such business-like reforms in public service 
include initiatives such as Public Service 2000 in Canada, Next Steps 
in the United Kingdom, Renewal of the Public Service in France, 
Financial Management Improvement program in Australia, 
Administrative Management Program in Austria, Modernization 
Program for the Public Sector in Denmark, and Major Options Plan in 
Portugal (OECD 1993). This new genre of administrative reforms, 
often generalized as New Public Management, can also be found 
under various titles in countries such as Belgium, Brazil, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, and Zambia." 
The need to re-evaluate previous assumptions and means of doing found an echo 
at the supranational level as weil, particularly in the case of the EU, a organization 
that is almost state-like in the range and the depth of its activities. The EU 
undertookjust such an effort with its 2001 governance white paper. 
At the level of the EU, the effort to re-imagine governance is captured by 
'subsidiarity'-to borrow EU terminology-which aims to push responsibilities 
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down to the lowest level of government possible, eventually as far down as 
individual regions. (This form of devolutionxviii is over and above the question of 
identity politics and new social movements that Mann described earlier and which 
we will investigate later in the section on sub-national governments.) ln the case 
of the EU, the goal of governance reform is actually more pragmatic than that. It 
is more concerned with the Union's ability to both remain relevant and to secure 
the necessary buy-in over time to continue its efforts. 
The line of thinking underlying the performance state, and by extension portfolio 
specialization, is reflected at the sub-national level as weil where it is known as 
'unbundling'. Denton and Flinders (2006:1-2) describe the dynamic behind it: 
"The relationship between national governments and the regions 
within that nation-state are both dynamic and complex. In recent 
years this complexity has been augmented by the centrifugai 
pressures of new public management, which have encouraged the 
creation of increasingly fragmented state structures, at the national, 
regional, and local level. .. " 
However, devolution in the na me of the performing state is like decentralization 
in that it is not without its critics who question the long-term impact of the 
reforms, thus calling into question the level of strategic thinking involved in its 
deployment. Describing the situation in the United Kingdom following the 1997 
devolution of a series of powers to Scotland and Wales, Bache and Flinders 
(2004:43) write, 
..... It is clear that devolution has led to the de facto creation of an 
increasingly dissagregated (sic) state, a quasi-judicial constitution 
in which inter-governmental disputes are decided by the judicial 
committee of the Privy Council and soon the Supreme Court, 
multiple and confused lines of accountability, shared or negotiated 
sovereignty within the European context, a fragmented civil service 
and increasingly distinct and explicit Welsh and Scottish foreign 
policies." 
Taken together, the notions of core competencies and the performing state, as 
weil as the thinking behind modern portfolio theory, effectively provide impetii 
for the disaggregation of the nation-state. Indeed, the notion of the performing 
state essentially strips away the 'missionary' or nationalistic-emotional aspect 
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historically found behind the provision of publie goods and heretofore used to 
justify their continued provision by the nation-state. In its place is left a dyad of 
'public goods producer' (the State) and 'publicgoods consumers' (the Citizens). 
The generalized acceptance of this dyad is. a key stepping..:stone on the way to 
eventually relieving the State of its role as goods producer, thus transforming the 
dyad into a triad, with the State as monitor-or to echo Drucker's approach, the 
entity charged with steering-in collaboration with citizens as public goods 
consumers and non-state actors as public goods producers. 
By putting forth the notion of outcomes as being quantifiable, essentially binary 
in nature, the performing state concept facilitates the comparison of outcomes 
between goods providers. Of course, the next logical step after comparison-
particularly when one's provider has been found wanting-is to shop around. 
Schick (2003:73) writes, 
"Performance is a demanding test. When the state fails to meet the 
test, its legitimacy and competence may be called into question, and 
policy-makers and interest groups may seek substitutes that 
promise the results they want. To put the matter bluntly, in the 
performing state, performance is more important than the state. 
The modern state has primacy only to the extent that it performs. 
Inasmuch as the state still has first claim on national loyalty and tax 
revenues, the initial tranche of performance enhancing reforms 
strives to empower the state. But when this fails to produce results, 
alternatives to the state may be favoured." 
Accelerated technological change 
ln discussing his model for determining the optimal size of countries on the basis 
of the ability to collect tax revenues net of collection costs, Friedman (1977:60) 
suggested that, "in most places at most times, [there were] net diseconomies of 
scale in collection costs. This seems plausible, especially prior to the invention of 
such aids to bureaucracy as the printing press and the telegraph." Following 
Friedman's line of reasoning, the advent of communications technology initially 
served to increase the size of the State through reduced collection and 
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coordination costs, thus enabling the centralization of the provision of publie 
goods. 
However, beyond a certain point of technological development (and associated 
economies of scale), those same technologies have the ability to reduce the 
required scope of the nation-state as weil. The advent of cheap international long 
distance rates and Internet connectivity, combined with the commoditization of 
information technology, has enabled the growth of a worldwide outsourcing 
industry. While the outsourcing industry had initially focused on serving 
organizations in the private sector, it has since turned its attention to servicing 
the public sector as weil. 
That states have not outsourced more on the basis of technology costs alone is 
essentially the result of political resistance, focusing on the perceived limited 
electabilityof politicians who support the matter. On the domestic front, efforts 
to outsource consistently run up against entrenched government unions and 
populist opportunism. Looking only at the' situation in the United States, from 
2003 until September 2005, Lee et al (2005:2-3) counted a total of 46 states that 
had proposed sorne form of anti-offshoring XiX legislation, with Il states having 
adopted formai laws and 9 others subject to decrees by their respective 
governors. New Jersey adopted the most stringent requirement at the time, 
specifying that only American citizens could perform contracts for that state. 
Supranational organizations 
Donald Witt man (1991:127) describes one of the principal dynamics underlying 
the desirability of outsourcing the provision of publie goods: "In the economic 
sector, sometimes the best way for a firm to gain access to the unique skills 
associated with another firm is to become part of the more successful firm." The 
state equivalent of this is to join a supranational organization, thereby getting 
access 'on the cheap' to the best practices and the brightest minds. 
This trend towards supranational organizations as a means of outsourcing the 
provision of publie goods is the result of both 'push' and 'pull'. In Alberto Alesina 
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and Enrico Spolaore's 2003 book, "The 5ize of Nations", the authors put forth a 
theory for the development of countries that can be extended to address the 
rationale behind the 'push' by states to become members of international 
organizations. Their theory focused on the trade-off between "the benefits of 
country size versus the costs of heterogeneity of preferences, culture, attitudes of 
the population." ln their book, the authors consider factors' that speak to the 
benefits of being part of a larger country, specifically: 
1) The per capita costs of public goods; 
2) The ability to address foreign aggression; 
3) Internai market size; 
4) The ability of larger countries to isolate or buffer one region from 
economic difficulties in another; 
5) The ability to spread externalities over the population base; and 
6) The ability to implement redistribution schemes. 
Membership in a supranational organization addresses each of the factors 
identified by Alesina and Spolaore that would have historically favoured a larger 
country size. For example, membership of the EU enables member states to 
spread the per capita costs of public goods (factor #1) over a much larger 
population, one frequently larger than that of most nation-states. In fact, the EU 
was explicitly designed to create ,a much bigger internai market (factor #3) over 
time for the goods and services of its members.xx 
ln addition, membership of a supranational organization such as the EU also 
enables member states to effectively internalize the many additional externalities 
created by the organization itself (factor #5). Take defence as an example. 
Through the sheer combined size of its membership, an organization like the 
EU-initially focused on economic issues-can also provide an effective 
counterweight to most attempts at foreign aggression (factor #2); in essence, to 
pick a fight with one EU member is to pick a fight with the whole organization. In 
this case, the ability of smaller member countries to not only free-ride, but to 
actually gain access to incremental war fighting capability, is just one more of the 
attractions of membership of a supranational organization such as the EU. At the 
member state level, funds saved on defence or the provision of public goods by 
the Union can be affected to issues like redistribution (#6) or shoring up a region 
in times of economic difficulties (factor #4), though it is important to note that 
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the EU also offers its own dedicated redistribution schemes (e.g., Common 
Agricultural Policy, EU Infrastructure Fund). 
States have also seen the provision of public goods transferred to supranational 
organizations by means of a process of ·pulling'. In effect, they have delegated 
additional responsibility for the provision of public goods through a process 
known as political entrepreneurship, driven by the officiais and bureaucrats that 
represent these same supranational organizations. Andrew Moravcsik (1999:268), 
a prominent critic of the concept of supranational entrepreneurship, nonetheless 
describes the dynamic as follows: 
"Constructivists contend that international regimes should be viewed 
not as passive sets of rules, but as active sites of bureaucratie 
politics that empower international officiais to wield transnational 
influence-the critical question, they assert, is to explain this power 
and autonomy. In such cases the supranational officiais and 
institutions in question have no formai voting rights, financial 
resources, or coercive means at their disposaI. Instead, they are said 
to influence international negotiations through the persuasive 
manipulation of information and ideas. They exercise "leadership" 
rather than formai power. In short, they are "informai" political 
entrepreneurs." 
The classic case of supranational entrepreneurship is of course the European 
Union. Moravcsik (1999:268) describes that organization's unique capability for 
such entrepreneurship: 
liA substantial bureaucracy in the EC Commission, numbering around 
fifteen thousand, has a primary mandate to oversee daily passage 
and implementation of EC legislation. For this it is granted formai 
powers almost unique in internationallife, including a unique right 
of legislative proposai, limited control over administrative 
implementation, and, in sorne places, the right to launch legal 
processes of regulatory or judicial enforcement. The European Court 
of Justicè (ECJ) and the European Parliament also have substantial 
formai roles." 
This "self-sustaining and path-dependent process of unintended consequences -
'spillover'-that powers regional integration" (Moravcsik 1999:268) has resulted 
in more and more national prerogatives coming under the purview of the EU, 
including justice, social policy, environ mental law and other domains. Specifically 
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in the case of the European Union, the process of transferring responsibility for 
public goods. provision-measured at times in degrees-has been aided by the 
European Court of Justice's at times· generous. interpretation .of the 
responsibilities of the EU and the regulatory conditions required in member states 
for the Union to achieve its core treaty obligation to provide a common market. 
Whether the motivations that have ultimately led to expansion in scope and 
financial costs can be qualified as hubris or empire-building is beyond the scope 
of this effort. However it is fair to say that this supranational entrepreneurship 
demonstrates a number of the drawbacks associated with principal-agent 
relationships if left unattended. 
ln sum, in their ability to transform the nation-state, supranational organizations 
provide three main benefits, while offering little of the drawbacks associated with 
decentralization or fiscal federalism in their original forms. First, they are an 
effective means of mitigating many of the pressures that would have historically 
caused states to grow through conquest to achieve "critical mass". 
Second, being a member of an supranational organization not only provides for 
the like-for-like ex change of a public good produced at home for one produced 
outside the country, it also enables a member country to achieve a higher level of 
utility for the same overall expenditure or less, due to the presence of spillover 
effects. 
Thirdly, the ability to outsource the provision of public goods and to do so 
selectively, through targeted membership of supranational organizations, 
provides an effective means of addressing the potential negative externalities 
resulting from the historical trade-off between size and heterogeneity of 
preferences. The additional ability to opt out of specifie treaty clauses or 
programs-at least in the case of the EU-also acts as a release valve for 
preserving desired state-Ievel specificities. 
ln fact, at a certain level, the ability to effectively 'venue shop' among 
supranational organizations enables states to essentially fine-tune the net 
utility-a factor of spillovers and principal-agent costs-which they receive. 
However, while a given member country is able to both shop among 
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supranational organizations-as highlighted above-and in sorne cases, to pick 
and choose the clauses or conditions that apply to it, that is not to say that a 
given supranational organization will always be willing to accept new members. 
Sub-national entities 
The trend of outsourcing the provision of public goods in the direction of 
supranational organizations has been complemented by a parallel effort in the 
direction of sub-national governments, one that is not without its challenges. xxi 
As with supranational organizations, outsourced publie goods provision is both 
the result of pushing and pulling on behalf of state and sub-national actors 
respectively. 
The notion of 'pushing' is captured by decentralization, which we examined 
earlier in this chapter. Hooghe and Marks (2003:237-38) iIIustrate the extent of 
delegation of responsibilities to sub-national levels of government with a look at 
the situations in Switzerland and the us. 
"[Switzerland features] six types of functional, overlapping, 
competitive jurisdictions that complement or compete with general-
purpose local governments. These communes, of which there are 
about 5,000, perform specialized tasks, such as providing local 
schooling, electricity, gas, water, or street lighting. In addition, 
hundreds of intercommunal associations provide specialized public 
goods on a larger scale, including, for example, hospitals, nursing 
homes, or garbage collection ... The closest functional equivalent in 
the United States consists of "special districts," which, as in 
Switzerland, have intersecting territorial boundaries and perform 
specifie tasks .... Overall, the number of special districts [in the US] 
has seen a threefold rise, from 12,340 in 1952 to 35,356 in 2002. 
Ninety-one percent of these are single-function districts, dealing 
with one of the following: natural resources, fire protection, water 
supply, housing, sewerage, cemeteries, libraries, parks and 
recreation, highways, hospitals, airports, electric power or gas 
supply, or publie transit." 
One example of what we would cali 'pulling' is the desire by local or regional 
governments to move at a faster pace or with a level of attention to local or 
regional specificities than the central government is capable of offering. It is 
often the case that sorne sub-national governments want to put in place higher 
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levels of regulation than the central government is willing to allow. An example of 
this comes from the state of California, which is effectively exempted from the 
rules of the federal Environmental. Protection Agency in order .to more 
aggressively address the air quality needs specific. to that sté3.te. In fact, the 
California Air Resources Board (CARB), founded in 1967, is unique among the fifty 
American states in its ability to set its own emissions standards. 
However, notwithstanding the economic and coordination benefits of moving the 
provision of services doser to the citizens receiving them, the delegation of 
responsibilities towards regional and local governments has been driven in large 
part by what Mann (1997) calls identity politics and regional movements. rhese 
movements claim such rights as territorial autonomy, self-government, and even 
the ability to veto or opt-out of centrally planned programs or legislation. 
Axtmann (2004:264) writes that their, "demands are premised upon the belief 
that only by possessing and exercising these rights, powers, and immunities will 
it be possible for these communities to ensure the full and free development of 
their culture." 
Addressing this same dynamic, Sambanis and Milanovic (2004:4) speak of a 
demand for sovereignty, which they define as, 
" ... an organized effort to increase political power and representation 
at the center of political authority or, alternatively, to attain greater 
administrative and legislative independence from the center and 
greater control over the territory in which a group demanding 
sovereignty lives." 
Sambanis and Milanovic qualify this demand for sovereignty as a form of political 
decentralization, whereas Tiebout's decentralization can be thought of as fiscal 
decentralization. In the words of Sambanis and Milanovic (2004:6), political 
decentralization " ... takes cultural or political divisions as given and works around 
them to create a system of quasi-independence, reducing the level and depth of 
interaction between the center of power and peripheral regions." 
Whether these demands are reasonable or not-at a minimum, they exhibit many 
of the drawbacks of principal-agent relationships-and whether or not their long 
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term impact is fully understood, many nation-states have acquiesced to them in a 
bidto maintain national unity. However this has been shown to be a slippery 
slope over time as evidenced by continuing demands for powers in Quebec and 
Cataionia once previously exisÙng demands have been satisfied. In effect, this 
'slippery slope' constitutes the principal challenge and drawback of sub-national 
outsourcing. Axtmann (2004:264-65) speaks to the danger of such efforts, 
specifically on how they contribute to the phenomenon of identity politics: 
"These demands raise the question of the very nature, authority, and 
permanence of the 'multicultural,' or rather 'multicommunal,' state 
of which these various cultural communities are part .... The 
question has arisen as to how these communities can coordinate 
their actions in areas of common concern or common interest, for 
example, with regard to the environment, the economy, or military 
security ... The net effect would appear to be astate that is limited 
to act as the coordinator of these political and cultural networks 
that are formed bya plethora of 'cultural' communities." 
Private actors 
Private actors, whether non-governmental organizations (NGOs), publicly listed 
companies or private enterprises, are the last of the primary forces transforming 
the nation-state that we shall examine here. Like supranational organizations and 
sub-national entities, the growing role of private actors in the provision of public 
goods is the result of both 'pushing' and 'pulling'. And as with supranational 
organizations and sub-national entities, outsourcing to private actors is not 
without its challenges. 
One of the first public goods to be actively outsourced to the private sector was 
public security in the form of a time- and context-specific monopoly of violence. 
Founded in 1850, the Pinkerton National Detective Agency frequently played the 
role of private military contractor as the United States expanded westward and 
even that of secret service during the American Civil Warxxii . At its height, the 
agency was said to command more personnel than the federal army. (This would 
eventually lead the state of Ohio to outlaw the agency for fear it could be hired 
out as a private army or militia.xxiii) As the writ of the American government 
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expanded westwards, the need for the Pinkertons would eventually disappear 
with first the US army then local law enforcement taking its place. 
Following the decolonization of much of Africa and southern Asia in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the civil and inter-state wars that ensued, there was a resurgence 
of private military activity in the form of mercenaries. Bray ton (2002:309) writes 
that, "[the] increasing inability of weak governments to counter internai violence 
has created a ready market for private military forces." Avant (2004:153) 
describes this as a "transnational market for force" with states actively calling 
on-or 'pushing' to use our terminology-PMCs as active participants. 
However, in recent years the role of private military activity has taken on entirely 
new importance, as Bray ton (2002:303) describes here: 
"For nearly three centuries the accepted international norm was that 
only nation-states fought wars. Today, however, organizing units 
unrelated to the nation-state, from terrorists, mercenaries, 
guerrillas and warlords to non-state militias and private rnilitary 
corporations [PMCs], conduct war worldwide. Although the form of 
non-state force varies from one society to the next, the collective 
effect is the erosion of the state's monopoly on the use of violence." 
While the use of private military contractors had historically been associated with 
combat operations only-in the form of mercenaries-their role has since 
changed profoundly. This is highlighted by the two Gulf wars of recent memory. 
Whereas the US military had essentially handled ail aspects of equipping, arming, 
deploying, supplying, and feeding rnilitary personnel on its own in the 1991 
conflict, the prosecution of the 2003 conflict would be carried out much 
differently. There private military contractors such as Kellogg Brown & Root and 
Dyncorp International were intimately involved in the transport, shelter, feeding, 
and equipping of US troops. In addition to such support roles, PMCs were also on 
the ground providing primary security operations, following the cessation of 
major hostilities, as weil as training to indigenous government forces. According 
to The Economist newspaper (2007c), "The privatisation of military functions, 
from logistics to maintaining weapons, has reached the point that the Pentagon 
now regards contractors as an integral part of its 'total force'. America could not 
go to war without them."xxiv 
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This increase in private military activity in recent years, particularly its use by 
Western governments, is also due to other factors. The Cold War, and the policy 
of containment,provided politicians and the electorate with a ready-made excuse 
for the sustained deployment of rèsources and the need to accept a given level of 
casualties to protect a certain way of iife. The end of the Cold War took away this 
rationale as philosophical crutch. As Bray ton (2002:309) writes, "Fuelled by a 
post-Cold War shift away from the strategie confrontation of major powers ... 
politicians are disinclined to explain casualties to their electorates." 
Following the end of the Cold War, there was pressure to cash in the 'peace 
dividend' and as a result many countries saw their national armies dwindle in size 
and the quality of their kit. This effectively reduced their ability to respond to 
external threats. That armies have since stayed smaller in spite of heightened 
geopolitical tensions is in many cases due to budget choices; funds saved on 
defence expenditures can be used to care for aging societies. 
However, in many cases, the push towards using PMCs is for less straightforward 
reasons. PMCs have often been called upon to sidestep the usual systems of 
checks and balances-whether for reasons of budget allocations, separation of 
powers (the ability to declare war or deploy forces; see the Iran-Contra scandai), 
or to respect client nation concerns about the presence of troops under another 
flag-while still maintaining the ability to project power. xxv As Bray ton (2002:309) 
notes, ..... Private military companies can help policymakers achieve their goals 
free from the need to secure public approval and safe in the knowledge that, 
should the situation deteriorate, official participation can be denied." 
There is also a determination, specifically in the case of the US, to avoid imperial 
overstretch. For former colonial powers such as Great Britain and France, there is 
the challenge of not appearing to re-stoke imperial ambitions in the hearts and 
minds of their own citizens while also appeasing fears in former colonies. PMCs 
provide a convenient end-run around both of these issues. 
There are also logistical and tactical challenges involved with the smaller-scale 
"asymmetrical" war fighting of today that leave traditional military forces at a 
disadvantage. As Bray ton (2002:309) notes, 
"Most Western armies are designed to fight the sophisticated 
international conflicts envisioned by Cold War strategists. The 
armies are neither trained nor equippèd for low-intensity civil wars, 
which involve complicated ethical agendas, blurred boundaries 
between combatants and civilians and loose military hierarchies." 
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Echoing the advantages of other private actors, PMCs provide access to 
potentially more modern techniques (e.g., military doctrines), looser rules of 
engagement, and lower overhead in terms of the support personnel necessary for 
sustained deployment that may make them better suited to these conflicts. 
However, the trend towards' outsourcing defence and security matters, while 
offering a range of benefits, is not without its consequences. Avant (2004: 154) 
writes, 
"Along with this market [for force] has come speculation about its 
consequences for states and global governance. Optimists have 
argued that privatization is likely to yield benefits for states-
[private security contractors] will deliver new security services 
cheaply and flexibly in ways that will enhance state security-and 
thus global governance. Pessimists have argued that privatization 
will be costly to states-eroding accountability and enhancing 
conflict and thus challenging global governance." 
According to Bray ton (2002:303-04), the privatization of security calls into 
question the notion of '''trinitarian warfare'-the rule born at Westphalia that has 
gUided modern conflict with the principle that in war 'it is the government that 
directs, the army that fights, and the people who suffer.'" 
Private actors have also been 'pushed' into the provision of publiC goods by 
broad social forces transforming much of the Western World. These are the twin 
forces of declining birth rates-many of which have fallen below the natural 
population replacement rate-and an expected mass exodus of the workforce by 
the Baby Boom generation. In the context of plugging just the baby boomer gap 
alone, Javers (2007) writes about the expected growth in the breadth and the 
depth of private sector offerings to the public sector in the USA: 
"Government contractors are betting the [government] agencies' 
recruitment efforts will go only so far. Where are they most likely to 
replace retiring boomers? They are loath to say for competitive and 
political reasons .... And while contractors typically take over back-
office and IT positions, they're vying for some unusual jobs these 
days. For example, the Army Contracting Agency, which supplies 
troops in the field, is looking to outsource the writing of quarterly 
reports to Congress on behalf of the special inspector general for 
Iraq reçonstruction." 
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Private actors have been 'pulling' to take over the provision of public goods 
particularly following the worldwide wave of privatizations of state-owned 
enterprises in the 1990s. Privatization was in itself an indirect form of 
outsourcing the provision of publie goods. Those same organizations, driven by a 
common market-based imperative-the desire to increase shareholder value-are 
now looking to increase the range of services they provide and the number of 
'customers' (i.e., nation-states) to which they provide them.xxvi We will address 
this dynamic further in Chapter 3. 
Many of the factors that led states to delegate matters of defence to PMCs (e.g., 
access to new skills, the ability to provide political cover and its corollary ability 
to blame, the ability to avoid normal checks and balances) have led states to want 
to outsource other publie goods provision to the private sector. However, there 
are downsides as weil to delegating the provision of public goods, principally due 
to the agency problem. This is created by a misalignment of interests and 
information between the principal (Le., the State) that pays the bills and is 
ultimately responsible to the citizenry and the agent (i.e., the private actor) that is 
not responsible to the same constituency. 
Returning specifically to the case of outsourcing defence, there is the risk that the 
activities of PMCs will spill over beyond their original mandate. The very nature of 
their activities-their raison d'être-is conflict. Doing their job too successfully 
means that there is no more conflict and that they are effectively out of a job. In 
countries with weak governance, the potential for PMCs to become active 
protagonists in the conflict is non-negligible and is eerily reminiscent of 
Eisenhower's 1961 warnings about the military industrial complexxXvii. 
Another example of hubris or empire building introduced by the agency problem 
is the potential for agents to expand the scope of their activities. In the case of 
PMCs, this has meant the addition of commercial activities alongside and under' 
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the cover of military operations. Many conflicts have their origins in the fight for 
control of natural resource wealth. Bray ton (2002:305) talks of a "troubling link 
between low-intensity conflicts and strategie minerais". Even where the conflict is 
not about natural resources, there is scope for mission creep. Originally launched 
to combat the rebel soldiers of the FARC, the Colombian paramilitary forces 
known as the AUC eventually became involved with the production and sale of 
cocaine just like the FARe. The conflict thus took on its own logic with both the 
FARC and the AUC wreaking havoc, eventually attacking the general population as 
weil as government soldiers, in order to protect thei'r booming trade. Part of the 
irony of Plan Colombia, which sees the Government of Colombia accept US 
financial and military aid in the shape of Special Forces 'advisers', is that it is in 
effect calling in a third party to deal with an existing third party-calling in an 
outsourcer to manage an outsourcing relationship that had gone sour. 
ln principal-agent relationships, the principal is ultimately responsible for the 
agent's performance; this is no different with State-private actor relationships 
than it is between the management and shareholders of a publicly traded firm. In 
the case of defence as a good outsourced by the private sector, the extent to 
which private military activity really is private is open to sorne debate. Historically, 
states could be counted on to intervene in the affairs of another country should 
the citizens of the first country be unreasonable inconvenienced (detained, 
attacked, killed) by the second. Responses to such incidents are the stuff of 
military legend and international arbitration as weil. The early years of the 
projection of US power, known as 'Small Wars' (Boot 2002), are littered with such 
cases. The intervention by the United States off of the coast of Malta on February 
16, 1804, to rescue the surviving members of the navy frigate Philadelphia-sent 
out the year before to put down attacks by the Pasha of Tripoli on American 
merchantmen-is one of the most weil known. Exactly 200 years (and 2 months 
later), US Marines entered the city of Fallujah, Iraq, to avenge the killings of 4 
private military contractors, sealing off the entire city in the process, at additional 
cost in blood and treasure. 
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New forms of governance 
Now that we have examined those forces transforming the nation-state, let us 
know our turn attention to the resulting forms of governance. 
When considering the nation-state during the three centuries following the treaty 
of Westphalia, we must consider both the governance model as weil as the actual 
arrangement of powers. In formulating our framework for the delegation of publie 
goods provision, we took into consideration the following concepts for describing 
these new forms: interdependence, distributed publie governance, and multi-
level governance. However, before examining them, we will briefly review the 
models and early forms of state organization that they are considered to have 
replaced. 
Early forms of state organization 
As the nation-state grew in territory and population, it took on new forms to 
address the scope and complexity of providing public goods to ever-greater 
numbers of citizens and ever-greater demands by them. For the purposes of 
demonstration, we will oversimplify the earliest forms of the nation-state as weil 
as timeframes in order to focus our attention on the State's more recent 
incarnations. 
The states that existed around the time of the Peace of Westphalia were 
characterized by a generally straightforward relationship between the producers 
and the consumers of public goods. The producer-the State-was led by a King 
or other executive power of a similar nature, who acted via a handful of 
handpicked operatives that oversaw other state employees (army, constabulary, 
tax collectors) to provide public goods to the general populace. The transmission 
mechanism for decisions was simple and frequently one-way: only the King 
decided; his operatives acted onhis decisions; and the people received their 
public goods in due time. The King was the executive power, the legislative 
power, and the judiciary ail rolled into one. His operatives served at his-and only 
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his-pleasure and could be (Iiterally) terminated at will, the threat of which could 
simplify most coordination challenges. 
Sorne states at that time operated under a primitive form of constitutional 
monarchy. This inserted a legislative body into the mix, which needed to be 
consulted with to achieve the royal objectives. Appointed and not elected, the 
legislative body was responsible only to itself and to the King. However, there was 
still no complete, formai feedback loop-another way of understanding a 
transmission mechanism-between the executive power, the legislative body, the 
operatives tasked with putting decisions into practice, or the people, and so the 
challenges of coordination increased correspondingly. 
As the model of a constitùtional monarchy evolved, the right of initiative was 
completely transferred to the legislative body. This body acquired a leader, who 
shared sorne measure of executive power with others-ministers or secretaries-
who were responsible to him first and foremost, as weil as to the legislature 
itself. The King was essentially left with the ability to approve or reject legislation 
and not much more. As weil as additional coordination issues, the need to 
bargain with others simply to develop as weil as implement legislation resulted in 
increased structural complexity and diminished flexibility. 
Minus a good number of sitting kings and other royals, and the introduction of 
the popular vote-in varying degrees by country and time-it is at this point that 
we renew with the literature. The dominant governance model from this point on, 
and up until quite recently, is known as the Westminster model. The Westminster 
model is notable for the notion of ministerial responsibility to Parliament. It 
assumed that a given minister was ultimately responsible for ail activities carried 
out under his/her purview. Failing that capability, a minister was expected to 
resign, to be replaced by someone else. Bache and Flinders (2004:33) write that, 
"the [Westminster model] contained a strong normative dimension, describing not 
just how government was thought to work but how it should work." With the 
Westminster model, the feedback loop was effectively complete: the people 
receiving public goods were able to vote for the mernbers of the legislature who 
made the laws that affected the provision of public goods. 
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Prior to the forces described earlier in this document, the two principal forms of 
state organization that leveraged the Westminster model were the centralized 
state (e.g., France (1789), the United Kingdom (1707 with Scotland; 1801 with 
Ireland) and the state as federation (e.g., Canada (1867), USA (1789), Australia 
(1901». As Hooghe and Marks (2003:233) write, the federation approach 
consisted of a "coherent system of nested governments", while centralized states 
featured policies, priorities, and funding dictated from the centre. Hirst (2002) 
dates the turning point in the dominant models of governance to the start of 
World War l, focusing specifically on decentralization and globalization, two of 
the main forces discussed earlier. 
Let us now consider three modified forms of governance as studied by the 
academic community; interdependence, distributed public governance, and 
multi-Ievel governance. These forms of governance can be understood to a 
certain extent as a continuum of thinking, an evolution of ideas that has occurred 
in parallel with some more recent changes to the nation-state over the last thirty 
years. Annex Il shows the evolution of these forms of governance over time. 
Interdependence 
One of the earliest terms used to describe this new form of state organization is 
that of interdependence. According to Hanrieder (1978: 1278), 
" ... There has developed on the global level an interconnected and 
intensified flow of national-vertical, international-horizontal, 
transnational-Iateral and supranational-integrative processes-a 
complex of relationships, usually described as interdependence, in 
which demands are articulated and processed through formai as 
weil as informai channels, governmental as weil as non-
governmental organizations, national as weil as international and 
supranational institutions." 
Though he considers that this interdependence was originally enabled by a 
"permissive context" of liberal trade and money flows, the absence of 
protectionism and the presence of other liberal institutions and ideologies, 
Hanrieder (1978:1286) puts forward the idea that politics has subsequently 
maintained it as such: 
r 
"Interdependence is sustained because these interest calculations do 
not allow the disintegration of interdependence toward a more 
fragmented and contentious international system but neither propel 
it toward more integration and supranationality. Interdependence, 
and the coordination required for its operation, is a halfway house 
between disintegration and integration of political and economic 
processes. Interdependence is the prototypical phenomenon of an 
international system that derives its dynamics from the pursuit of 
the national interest as weil as of interests that are narrower and 
larger than the national interest." 
Distributed Public Governance 
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The second major form of governance that we shall consider is 'distributed public 
governance', a term the OECD (2001:6) uses to refer to the wider state sector, 
which includes, 
"", ail bodies that are part of local or national government and have 
been given some autonomy and/or some independence from the 
ministries to which they report and/or are subject to a completely or 
partially different set of management and financial rules from 
traditional vertically integrated ministries." 
Distributed public governance has been driven in large part by the mantra of 
decentralization, a powerful force we examined earlier in this chapter, that has 
fundamentally transformed the provision of public goods, inserting sub-national 
entities into ail phases of public goods design, conception and delivery. 
According to Flinders (2004a:884), distributed public governance, "widens the 
focus of analysis to encompass the growing number of independent bodies that 
operate at the supra-national and global level." Whereas the notion of 
interdependence was essentially concentrated on relationships between nation-
states or between the nation-state and one or more supranational organizations, 
distributed public governance adds governance at the sub-national level. As 
shorthand for distributed public governance, Veggeland (2003) uses the notion of 
downward and outwards to describe this dispersion of responsibilities. Bache and 
Flinders (2004:45) add, 
"Whereas devolution signifies the movement of functions downward 
to the sub-national level, the Government's public sector reforms 
have propelled functions sideways. The outcome of these processes 
is arguably the creation of complex matrices in which functions 
have been re-distributed both verticallyand horizontally." 
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ln the context of the EU, distributed public governance takes the shape of formai 
mechanisms 'suchas quasi-autonomous agencies created by Union treaties, as 
weil as subsidiarity, which seeks to push responsibility down to the lowest level 
possible, p.otentially even the sub-national regional level, where it is captured by 
the Euro-speak notion of 'l'Europe des régions'. This development goes back to 
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which Veggeland (2003: 12) says "not only 
challenged the member states by introducing more supranational competence, 
but also in terms of challenging the national state to perform downward 
devolution to the regions." 
As Veggeland (2003:10) writes, distributed publie governance takes "its 
legitimacy from a constitutional model weighting functionality more than 
parliamentary legitimacy." Referring to the case of Norway specifically, Veggeland 
(2003:29) indicates this has come at the cost "deficits of co-ordination and 
planning authorities, institutional coherence and democracy." 
Multi-Ievel governance 
Gary Marks coined the term 'multi-Ievel governance' (MLG) in 1993. Bache 
(2004:35) writes that he defined it as "a system of continuous negotiation among 
nested governments at several territorial tiers- supranational, national, regional 
and local-as the result of a broad process of institution al creation and decisional 
reallocation." According to Bache (2004:35), "For Marks, 'multi-Ievel' referred to 
the increased vertical interdependence of actors operating at different territorial 
levels, while 'governance' signalled the growing horizontal interdependence 
between governments and nongovernmental actors." 
Hooghe and Marks (2003:234) propose two models, or 'types' as they label them, 
of multi-Ievel governance. (See Table 1 on page 43) 
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Table 1: Types of Multi-Level Governance 
Types of Multi-Ievel Governance 
Type 1 Type 1/ 
General-purpose jurisdictions Task-specific jurisdictions 
Nonintersecting memberships Intersecting memberships 
Jurisdictions at a limited No limit to the number of 
number of levels jurisdictional revers 
System-wide architecture Flexible design 
Source: (Hooghe and Marks 2003:236) 
Type 1 Multi-Level Governance 
Type 1 multi-Ievel governance is based on an approach of federalism with non-
overlapping entities, each responsible for a given activity. With this type of 
governance, 
"Decision-making powers are dispersed across jurisdictions but 
bundled in a small number of packages .... Membership is usually 
territorial, as in national states, regional, and local governments, 
but it can also be communal, as in consociational polities. Such 
jurisdictions are defined by durable boundaries that are 
nonintersecting at any particular level. Moreover, the memberships 
of jurisdictions at higher and lower tiers do not intersect." (Hooghe 
and Marks 2003:237) 
Type Il Multi-Level Governance 
As for Type Il multi-Ievel governance, it is characterized by a situation, 
" ... in which the number of jurisdictions is potentially vast rather 
th an limited, in which jurisdictions are not aligned on just a few 
levels but operate at numerous territorial scales, in which 
jurisdictions are task-specific rather than general-purpose, and 
where Jurisdictions are intended to be flexible rather than durable." 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003:237) 
Comparing the two types of MLG, Bache and Flinders (2004:39) write, 
"Type 1 MLG echoes federalist thought, conceiving the dispersion of 
authorityas being restricted to a 'limited number of non-
overlapping jurisdictional boundaries at a limited number of levels'. 
ln this view, authority is relatively stable and analysis is focused on 
individual levels of government rather than specifie policies. Type Il 
MLG provides a vision of governance that is 'a cornplex, fluid, 
patchwork of innumerable, overlapping jurisdictions'. Here, 
governance locates around particular functions and jurisdictions 
tend to be flexible as demands for governance change." 
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Describing the situation in Britain, Bache and Flinders (2004:32) contrast multi-
lever governance with the Westminster model seen earlier. As they see it, "MLG 
directs attention to a complexity, cross-sectoral engagement and contestation of 
legitimate authority between actors organized at different territorial levels that 
increasingly speaks to the nature of British governance." Table Il provides a more 
comprehensive overview of the differences between the two model types. 
Table Il: Contrasting organising perspectives of governance: Westminster 
model and Multi-Ievel polit y 
Contrasting Organising Perspectives: Westminster Model and Multi-Ievel Polit y 
Westminster Model Multi-Ievel polit Y 
Centralised state Disaggregated state 
General Principles 
Hierarchy Heterarchy 
Control Steering 
Clear lines of accountability Multiple lines of accountability 
External Dimensions 
Absol ute sovere ig nt y Relative sovereig nt y 
Britis h foreig n pol icy Multiple foreign policies 
InternaI Dimensions 
Unitary State Quasi-federal state 
Parliamentary sovereignty Inter-institutional bargaining 
Strong executive Segmented executive 
Direct Governance Delegated Governance 
Unified civil service Fragmented civil service 
Political constitution Quasi-judicial constitution 
Britis h foreig n policy Multiple foreign policies 
Source: Adapted from Rhodes (1997) and Bache and Flinders (2004), in Bache and 
Flinders (2004:38). 
As Bache and Finder (2004:36-7) note, "it is increasingly common for sub-
national actors and supra-national actors to communicate directly without 
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working through the national level." This idea of communication among non-
state actors is one that distinguishes multi-Ievel governance from simple 
decentralization or distributed public governance as discussed earlier. 
ln 2001, MLG was advanced by the European Union in an attempt to describe the 
dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels 
(Bache and Flinders, 2004). Hooghe and Marks (2003:234) write that in its 2001 
whitepaper on governance, the EU saw its internai organization as being "based 
on multi-Ievel governance in which each actor contributes in line with his or her 
capabilities or knowledge to the success of the overall exercise."xxviii When applied 
to the EU, which we can consider as a Type 1 model-though a case could be 
made for a trend towards Type II-the MLG model comprises three central tenets: 
"First, that while nation states remain central actors in policy-
making, decision-making competencies are shared and contested 
by actors organised at different territorial levels rather than 
monopolised by national governments. Second, collective decision-
making among states in the EU involves a significant loss of control 
for individual national governments. Third, political arenas are 
inter-connected, both formally and informally, rather than nested. 
Sub-national actors operate in both national and supra-national 
arenas, creating trans-national networks in the process. The 
'gatekeeper' role of national executives is therefore increasingly 
challenged: the effectiveness of the response varies considerably, in 
large part according to domestic territorial structures of 
governance." (Hooghe and Marks 2001:3-4) 
The major benefit of MLG is that jurisdictions can be "custom designed" to reflect 
heterogeneity in needs. As Hooghe and Marks (2003:235-6) write, MLG "allows 
decision makers to adjust the scale of governance ... " The chief cost of MLG 
comes from the transaction costs associated with coordinating decision-making 
and actions across multiple jurisdictions. Hooghe and Marks, (2003:239) write, 
"To the extent that policies of one jurisdiction have spillovers (i.e., 
negative or positive externalities) for other jurisdictions, so 
coordination is necessary to avoid socially perverse outcomes. We 
conceive this as a second-order coordination problem because it 
involves coordination among institutions whose primary function is 
to coordinate human activity. Second-order coordination costs 
increase exponentially as the number of relevantjurisdictions 
increases." 
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Hooghe and Marks (2003) describe this capability as one of pliability. As they see 
it, 
"Many Type Il jurisdictions facilitate entry and exit to create a market 
for the production and consumption of a publie good. Most do not 
seek to resolve fundamental disagreements by deliberation but, 
instead, avoid them altogether by allowing individuals to choose 
among competing jurisdictions. Proponents of competing 
arrangements like to say that Type 1 jurisdictions choose citizens, 
while citizens choose Type Il jurisdictions." (Hooghe and Marks, 
2003:240-41). 
Conclusion 
The resulting evolution of the nation-state from somewhat isolated, self-
contained entity interacting with a handful of immediate neighbours-as captured 
by the concept of interdependence-to open, disaggregated political unit acting 
as focal point for relations between supranational organizations, sub-national 
governments, private actors, and its citizens-as captured by the idea of multi-
level governance-paves the way for the next logical step. The qualitative shift 
brought about by the philosophy of new publie management and the performing 
state, with its focus on outcomes at the expense of the 'missionary' or 
nationalistic-emotional aspect of public goods provision, provides the necessary 
unhitching or disconnect from the previous ways of thinking. Together, they go a 
long way towards achieving Drucker's vision of the State as the entity charged 
with steering while others row. 
The ultimate expression of this is of course what The Economist described as the 
'Singaporean operating system', as we saw in the introduction to this text. 
According to this perspective, the State brings a holistic expertise at tying 
together the necessary inputs (land, natural resources, and people) and providers 
of outputs (public goods) to satisfy the needs of citizens and businesses. 
Before moving on to the next chapter where we will develop our framework, sorne 
final words on the nation-state itself. Notwithstanding these forces transforming 
the nation-state, Allen Schick (2003:94-95) concludes that not only will it be with 
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us for a very long time to come, but that it will also continue to retain its central 
role: 
"The nation-state played a critical role in the rise of political 
democracy and markets .... But like other hoary institutions, the 
nation-state is fraying at the edges, and the demand for good 
performance has focused attention on its real or imagined 
inadequacies. The bill of particulars against the nation-state qua 
performer is formidable: it is alleged to be too distant from citizens, 
too uniformist in the design and delivery of publie services, 
encumbered by rigid, aloof bureaucracies and by cumbersome, 
performance-draining procedures, insensitive to the diverse needs 
and interests of citizens, more beholden to compliance and control 
than to performance and results, more responsive to the powerfu1 
and affluent who have less need for their services than to the poor 
and weak who are utterly dependent on the state, unable to cope 
with global forces that spill beyond national boundaries. These 
allegations notwithstanding, the nation-state has not withered 
away, nor will it in the decades immediately ahead. It still is the 
main financial engine and rule maker for public services." 
Indeed, as Drucker (1997) notes at the end of his essay, "whenever in the last 200 
years political passions and nation-state politics have collided with economic 
rationality, political passions and the nation-state. have won." 1 n fact, the new 
forms that we have seen in this chapter can be understood as a natural 
adjustment of the nation-state to the forces at work. Those who see in this a sign 
of weakness mistake what is instead a sign of strength, an institutional survival 
mechanism of sorts. 
ln fact, it may be premature to concede victory on behalf of those forces looking 
to transform the nation-state. Inman (1997:50) points to the role of the nation-
state as umpire or arbiter of last-resort wh en sub-national entities can't agree 
and concludes that, 
"Our reading of the historical and contemporary evidence does not 
provide much support for the claim that lower-tier governments can 
solve their important collective action problems on their own 
through unanimous Coasian agreements. If economic federalism 
seems too biased in favor of centralization, cooperative federalism 
seems to bias the fiscal constitution too far in the other direction." 
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At the end of the day, in spite of the challenges facing it, there is nothing else 
able to replace the nation-state. It is at once the base unit of the international 
system and the linchpin regulating interactions between the international system 
and other non-state actors. In spite of ail the challenges to its continued 
existence and good functioning, the nation-state continues to be the reference 
point for ail actors. As Paquet (2001:183) writes, "While governance capabilities 
are not necessarily as tightly packaged in national territorial niches as they were 
in earlier times, the territorial nation still plays a role of echo box through which 
much must be arbitrated." Those who want to take power away from the nation-
state must first recognize the nation-state to do so. Those peoples seeking 
independence from existing nation-states want to become nation-states in their 
own right. States pay the bills for supranational-organizations and collect much 
of the revenues that are distributed to sub-national entities and private actors 
alike. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
The principal goal of this effort is te provoke new thinking about the ways that 
public services can be provided. Indeed, we wish to bring to the decision to 
outsource a mu ch more strategie approach based on the rational evaluation of 
alternatives for providing public goods, calculated upon the immediate and long-
term benefits and costs of choosing a particular non-state actor or category of 
non-state actor over another. To achieve that, we seek to provide a means of 
quantifying both the potential scope and extent of a state's outsourcing 
capability as weil as to provide the ability to evaluate those efforts on a 
qualitative basis. 
Caveats 
As discussed earlier, it must be noted that this framework is not designed to 
provide an all-encompassing theory as such. Instead we seek an approach that 
charts a middle ground of pragmatism. Consequently, we will offer a number of 
caveats before proceeding. The first caveat of this framework is that it is not 
normative in nature. It assumes that a given level of delegation of provision of 
public goods will occur for a given state-based on a desire to align with the 
rationale of Tiebout, among other impetii for decentralization-and does not seek 
to propose outsourcing as such for those not philosophically in agreement with 
it. 
The second caveat of this framework is that it takes the issue of coordination 
costs as a given. As Hooghe and Marks (2003:239) indicate, "the chief benefit of 
multi-Ievel governance lies in its scale flexibility. Its chief cost lies in the 
transaction costs of coordinating multiple jurisdictions." For our purposes, we will 
assume that the leaders of a nation-state are prepared-ceteris paribus-to 
accept a given level of coordination-related financial costs and that, for that level, 
they will want to optimize ail other costs and benefits. However, we will consider 
any and ail costs specifically related to the principal-agent relationship over and 
above any formally contracted costs. 
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Hooghe and Marks (2003:240) provide sorne useful insight into the interaction 
between coordination costs and the development of Type Il governance models 
like the one we propose to develop here: 
"The alternative approach is to limit coordination costs by 
constraining interaction acrossjurisdictions. Type Il governance sets 
no ceiling on the number of jurisdictions but spawns new ones 
along functionally differentiated lines. As a result, externalities 
across jurisdictions are minimized." 
To paraphrase Alfred Sioan, the legendary chairman of General Motors, who 
described the number and variety of vehicles GM had to offer, thereÎs a non-state 
actor for "every purse and purpose."xxix 
The third caveat is that we shall not consider quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations (also known as quangos) put in place by the nation-
state as a separate type of goods provider. For our purposes-essentially to keep 
the model simple-we shall consider them to be part and parcel of the nation-
state itself. When we write of the potential desirability of keeping the provision of 
a given public good with the nation-state, we allow for it to be provisioned by a 
state-Ievel quango, thus respecting to sorne extent Tiebout's rationale as weil as 
the other forces behind decentralization described earlier, where and when it 
makes the most strategie sense. 
The fourth and final caveat is that we will abstract for any and ail political and 
geographical considerations. Though one could make the case that geography is 
the only variable that cannot be changed, and thus cannot realistically be 
abstracted, it would only take a change of regime in a given nation-state-or one 
of its neighbours-for the suggested applicability of this model and the choices 
and recommendations it makes to change. For example, the political situations of 
Turkey, the Ukraine, and Georgia-all of which sit on or near fault lines dividing 
the Arab World, the liberal-democratic Western World, and the autocratie Russian 
zone of influence-could conceivably change dramatically following an election or 
coup, with the usual consequences particular to that part of the world. 
Abstracting for geography enables us to position certain supranational 
organization as competitors for a given type of publie good. 
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Framework for the provision of public goods 
Our proposed framework for the provision of public goods is comprised of two 
principalelements. The first is a market for governance, which weshall define in 
a moment. The second is a series of criteria· for evaluating the various 
outsourcing options available, with an eye to capturing and maximizing utility; we 
shall define those criteria after first defining the market for governance and 
describing its constituent parts. 
Market for governance 
The ability to outsource responsibility for the provision of public goods is 
conditional on the presence of what we cali a 'market for governance'. The usage 
and meaning of the term 'market for governance' has not been fully settled and 
so we have developed our own definition.xxx ln fact, the term has only been used 
on three prior occasions, two of them by J. O. McGinnis. First in 2004 when he 
wrote, "Federalism, in turn, creates a market for governance ... ", and in July 2006 
when he wrote, "Decentralization creates a market for governance by allowing 
different jurisdictions to compete to attract people and investment. It also 
permits the formulation of diverse policies that meet peoples' diverse 
preferences." While McGinnis originally developed the concept of a 'market for 
governance', it was Pranab Bardhan and Tsung-Tao Yang that expanded on the 
notion and gave it the general sense we will use in the context of our framework. 
Bardhan and Yang (2004:6) wrote: 
"Let us turn now to a second interpretation of political competition, 
which focuses less on the process of political turnover and more on 
the extent to which political authority is decentralized .... The 
potential benefits of this second form of political competition are 
indeed largely akin to the potential benefits of competition between 
firms in a market for goods or services: in this case, political 
decentralization creates competition on the supply side of a 'market 
for governance', generating equilibrium outcomes that favor the 
demand side of that market, or the publie at large." 
ln the context of our framework, which leverages the notion of a market in the 
true economic sense, we define a 'market for governance' characterized by the 
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presence of two types of actors: state· actors that are willing to demand or 
'purchase' public goods for later provision .to citizens, and non-state actors that 
are willing to supply or 'sell' public goods. 
Ostrom and Ostrom (1999:16) introduce a similar market-like perspective with 
their notion of 'public service industries', where they see actors arrayed as either 
consumption units or production units. 
"Each citizen, in such circumstances, is served not by 'the' 
government, but bya variety of different public service industries. 
Each public service industry is composed of the collective 
consumption units serving as providers and production units 
serving as suppliers of some types of closely related public goods or 
services that are jointly consumed by discrete communities of 
individuals." 
Following Ostrom and Ostrom's approach, for any given public good, we can 
assume an associated industry: the fire protection industry, the transportation 
industry, the welfare industry, the health services industry, etc. Ostrom and 
Ostrom (1999:16) also make room in their model for non-state actors: 
"The governmental component in some industries, such as the police 
industry, will be proportionately larger than other industries, such 
as the health services or the transportation industry. But most 
public service industries will have important private components." 
Referring to Hooghe and Marks' typology seen in the previous chapter, our 
market for governance is compatible with a Type Il state model of multi-Ievel 
governance with its multiplejurisdictions, overlapping memberships, etc. 
Before continuing, let us pause to consider the role of markets in general. 
Markets, which bring multiple participants together, are particularly adept at 
facilitating a superior, if not always optimal, distribution of goods and services in 
a more timely fashion than would otherwise be possible. This is achieved by 
enabling participants to exchange-and more importantly, to compare-both 
implicit and explicit information regarding the priee or range of priees buyers 
would prefer to pay and the priee or range of prices sellers would prefer to 
receive for a given outcome, in this case, the outsourcing of a public good. 
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However, while markets provide an immediate solution to information asymmetry 
in the very short term, they donot necessarily always provide a completely 
effective solution in the long term. As a result, additional mechanisms are 
required to ensure long-term alignmèntof the interests of market participants, 
something we address later in the section on evaluation criteria. 
Demand side 
The number of actors willing to demand public goods is equivalent to the nurnber 
of nation-states that eXist-currently listed as 192xxxi by the United-Nations-
without counting special cases like Taiwan. Based on trends in Europe since the 
end of the Cold War and in light of current events in the Middle East and Africa, 
this number should continue to grow in coming years. For a non-state actor, 
particularly a private entity, interested in satisfying a new demand for publie 
goods, a positive change in the number of new nation-states is equivalent to a 
growth market; for actors on the demand side, this should serve to increase the 
overall supply of public goods over time. 
Supply side 
The supply side, while more diverse, can be divided into the three categories that 
we examined earlier: (1) supranational organizations; (2) sub-nationall regional 
government entities; and (3) private actors, whether they are non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), or publicly-listed or private enterprises with a mandate to 
deliver shareholder value in the form of growing profits or an increasing share 
priee. It is important to note that our framework also reserves a role for the 5tate, 
in the more traditional Westminster-model sense as weil via quangos though the 
latter are not explicitly considered as such here. 
An example of growth in the supply side-in sheer numbers and scope of offer-
is the former state-owned postal service of the Netherlands, formerly known as 
KPN. Founded in 1752 and nationalized in 1799, it would be spun-off nearly two 
hundred years later in 1994. In 1996, it merged with an Australian enterprise 
(Thomas Nationwide Transport), only to later separate the domestic Dutch 
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operations from the international courier company and become TNT Postal Group 
(TPG). In 2000, TPG, Britain's Royal, l\i1ail Group, a publicly regulated private 
provider of mail services in the British Isles, and Singapore Post, another. market-
listed mail operator, signed heads of agreement to commence establishing a 
global joint venture in cross border mail.xxxii As this example demonstrates, the 
market imperative that led to the initial privatization of those operators continues 
to provide its own powerful logic that drives operations-the supply side in our 
jargon-outside of initial home markets. 
Competition 
The existence of a market also implies a certain level of competition between 
providers, each seeking to secure 'customers' for reasons such as economies of 
scale, geographical coverage or critical mass, among others. Our market for 
governance is characterized by competition on two levels. First, there is 
competition among the three different types of non-state actors. There are publie 
goods (e.g., health care standards or infrastructure) for which supra-national, 
sub-national and private actors can conceivably ail compete on head-to-head to 
some degree. 
Second, there is competition between non-state actors of a given type. There are 
in fact multiple competing providers of publie goods at ail levels of our 
framework. While these are most likely to be found for private actors across 
states and sub-national government entities within states, we may also consider 
that there are competing providers of public goods at the supranational level as 
weil, though just not as many. 
Third, this market for governance is fluid across actor types, with the most 
growth in supranational organizations and private actors, particularly in the wake 
of the worldwide wave of privatizations in the 1980s and 1990s. Hooghe and 
Marks (2003:238) provide some perspective on the growth, evolution and 
volatility in supranational organizations alone: 
"A recent count of international governmental organizations shows 
steep growth over the past 50 years, from 70 in 1940 to more than 
one thousand in the 1980s. However, of 1,063 organizations 
existing in 1981, only 723 survived a decade later, while an 
additional 400 or so came into being." . 
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Abstracting for political and geographical considerations as discussed in the 
section on caveats, Table III (see next page) provides a li st of the various 
competing providers of publie goods available between actor types including the 
nation-state, while Table IV (see page 56) provides the same table but with a list 
of individual actors for each type of non-state actor and public good. 
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Table III: Ability to provide public goods 
Public good Nation- Supra- Sub- Private State national national actor 
Agriculture / Fisheries and X X X X Oceans 
Auditor general X X X X 
Citizenship (passports, etc.) X X X 
Civil service X X X 
Culture and X X X X 
communications 
Customs and Revenue X X X 
Defense X X X 
Ed ucation / Research X X X 
Employment Insurance X X X 
Employment / labour force X X X policy / training 
Energy policy X X X 
Environment X X X X 
Financial Oversight (Banks, 
stock markets, insurance X X X X 
companies) 
Foreig n Affairs X X X 
Health X X X X 
Homeland Security X X X 
Housing & Urban X X X Development 
Human Rights X X X 
Immigration X X X X 
Industrial Development 
(Export development / Farm X X X X 
Credit) 
Infrastructure X X X X 
Interior X X X X 
Lawmaking / justice / X X X X Tribunals 
Manaqement & Budget X X X X 
Monetary policy X X X 
Natural Resource X 
manaqement X X 
Postal Services X X X 
Public utilities (Energy, X X X Water) 
Re~ional Development X X X X 
Social Programs X X X X 
Sport / youth X X X 
Telecommunications X X X X 
Trade / commerce X X X 
Trans portation X X X X 
Veteran Affairs X X X 
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At first glance, Table III contains a number of publie goods that one would not 
think susceptible to being outsourced. There are two main reasons for this. The 
first is that, in many countries, a number of public goods are outsourced to non-
state actors on the basis of constitutional arrangements. In the case of Canada, a 
federation of sub-national governments, the British North America Act (BNAA), 
"established the division of powers between the central Parliament 
and the provincial legislatures. The federal government was 
responsible for, among other things, banking business, criminal 
law, the post office, the armed forces; the provinces could legislate, 
among other things, property law, contracts and local work."xxxiii 
While the BNAA and the Canadian Constitution of 1982 formally spell out the 
respective allocation of competencies for the production of publie goods, the 
United States Constitution of 1789 authorized that country's federal government 
"to exercise powers deemed necessary to rule over the nation as a whole, with a 
vague boundary between the two co-existing "Ievels" of government."xxXiV Those 
powers that are not explicitly reserved for the federal government were initially 
the domain of the individual states. However, over time, a number of those same 
powers have since become the preserve of the federal government through 
judicial rulings on the basis of the Supremacy Clause (Article VI, Clause 2 of the 
Constitutionyxxv. Thus the constitutional arrangements in place are an important, 
though not absolute, determinant of the potential of public goods outsourcing. 
The second reason is a shift towards focusing on outcomes, at the expense of the 
'missionary' or nationalistic-emotional aspect of public goods provision. This was 
discussed earlier in the section on management theory, more specifically via the 
concepts of NPM and the performing state. (As a result, public goods such as 
regional development or veterans affairs can be outsourced to the private sector 
and other non-state actors.) The qualitative shift brought about by those two 
concepts provides the necessary unhitching, or disconnect, from previous ways of 
thinking, thus facilitating the provision of public goods by non-state actors. They 
also simplify the eventual comparison among actors and their ability to deliver 'as 
promised'. Let us now turn to Table IV. 
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Table IV: Competing providers of public goods 
Public good Supra- Sub- Private Notes 
national national actor 
Agriculture / Fisheries EU X X 
and Oceans 
Auditor general X X KPMG, Deloitte 
Citizenship (passports, X IBM, 
etc.) Accenture 
Civil service X IBM, Accenture 
Paramount" 
Culture and X X Canal+, Hollywood studios 
communications Fox/News 
Corp. 
Customs and Revenue EU X IBM, (Schengen) Accenture 
PMC Definitely not NATO, (Blackwater desirable at the Shanghai USA, sub-national level; Cooperation Dyncorp, a country like Defense Organization, nIa Triple Ukraine or Georgia EU Rapid could make the 
Reaction Canopy, switch following a 
Force Aegis change in Defense, etc) leadership 
UC, & SLiNY Harvard, Private Education / Research OECD 
systems Stanford, universities; SUNY, UQ system 
Private providers 
like Desjardins, 
Employment Insurance X x etc. over and 
above core 
benefits 
Employment / labour IBM, See Germany 
force policy / training X Accenture following Hartz 
reforms 
Energy policy LIN, EU X X 
Environment UN, EU CARB (vs. EPA) 
FinancialOversight 
(Banks, stock markets, X OSC, AMF X 
insurance companies) 
Foreign Affairs EU, G77 X 
Health WTO Provincial US HMOs NHS in the UK is governments state-Ievel 
Garda, 
Homeland Security X Blackwater 
USA 
Housing & Urban X Pulte Homes, Development KB Homes 
Human Rights UNHCR, IBM, Assuming UNHRC Accenture objective criteria 
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can be developed 
and enforced 
Assuming 
Immigration X IBM, objective criteria Accenture can be developed 
and enforced 
Industrial Development 
(Export development / OECD / cAp X X 
Farm Credit) 
EU Bechtel, 
Infrastructure 1 nfrastructure X Lavalin, 
Fund Aistom, 
Interior EU X X (Maastricht) 
Lawmaking / justice / X X X Tribunals 
Manaqement & Budqet EU X X 
Monetary policy ECB X 
Natural Resource X X 
manaqement 
TNT, 
Postal Services IPU DeutschePost, 
RoyalMail 
Public utilities (Energy, TVA, Suez, Vivendi, Southern United Water Water) Company (div. of Suez) 
Reqional Development EU, ASEAN X 
Social Programs X X X 
Sport / youth X X 
Telecommunications ITU X AT&T, France Telecom 
WTO, G??, 
Trade / commerce G8, X Mercosur, 
EU, ASEAN, 
Veolia, DB, 
Transportation EU (Open X SNCF, Private Skies) airlines (not 
flag carriers) 
Veteran Affairs X HMOs 
Evaluation criteria 
Competition between providers means that the decision to delegate is not strictly 
defined on the basis of a purely dollar-driven economic dimension. In fact, aside 
from financial considerations, a multitude of other criteria come into play when 
evaluating a potential provider of public goods. They are: 
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• Technical expertise (spillover) 
• Economies of scale (spillover) 
• Hubris / empire building (principal-agent theory) 
• Financial costs (principal-agent theory) . 
• . Ability to blame (principal-agent theory) 
• Dual loyalties (principal-agent theory) 
• Ability to control (principal-agent theory) 
These can be broadly grouped into two categories: spillovers and the criteria used 
for evaluating the performance of principal-agent relationships. We have chosen 
these two broad categories of criteria for their ability to highlight the underlying 
drivers of the desire to outsource as weil as the dynamics at play once a 
relationship is in place. 
The decision to centralize or decentralize is largely determined by the dynamic 
surrounding the generation of externalities, or spillovers, and the ability to 
capture or internalize them. (We examined this dynamic in Chapter 2's discussion 
of Oates and fiscal federalism, as weil as Alesina and Spoloare's treatise on the 
size of nations.) As spillovers increase, there is a tendency towards centralization, 
first at the level of the State, and then afterwards, at the level of supranational 
organizations in order to capture them. A good example of this is defence, a 
blunt instrument of sorts whose success is contingent upon timely access to 
manpower and military kit, where there truly is strength in numbers. Where there 
is an opportunity to internalize spillovers at a lower level, there is a tendency to 
decentralize. An example of this is labour market policy, including employment 
insurance and training, where there are enough local specificities that a state-
level approach introduces more issues than it solves. 
At the heart of principal-agent theory is the notion of information asymmetry. 
This is the possibility that one party, the agent, by right of involvement or 
presence in the day-to-day activities of the firm or organization, has access to 
information-more timely or just mqre-than the principal (or owner) of the 
organization or the firm. This puts the agent at an advantage, and the principal at 
a disadvantage, in regards to decisions that must be made. As a result, without 
the proper mechanisms in place, the agent has a tendency to take decisions (e.g., 
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increasing financial exposure, empire building, etc.) at the expense of the 
principal. 
The results of these criteria combine to generate an overall measure that we cali 
utility and which expands on the notions presented earlier during our discussion 
on the terminology that would be used in this document. 
Characteristics of public-goods providers 
Starting with supranational organizations, then moving on to sub-national 
entities and private actors, we will now discuss in more detail each of the 
components of utility-spillovers and criteria relating to principal-agent 
relationships-as they apply to the different actor types, outlining the pros and 
cons of each criteria to paint a picture of a preferable outcome for each criteria. 
ln addition, whenever practical, we shall provide examples of these criteria at 
work. We will then summarize with a comparative table (Table V) at the end of 
this section. 
Su pranational organ izations 
Technical expertise 
Supranational organizations are frequently characterized by a high level of 
technical / technocratie expertise. It goes to the heart of what most supranational 
organizations are about, which is creating a common technical platform or a 
series of shared ways of doing. Inevitably, over time, this means that best 
practices usually find their way to the top and become encoded in the 
organization's policies and procedures. The sheer weight of their presence on the 
international scene means that supranational organizations also usually attract 
the scrutiny of academic researchers as weil as non-governmental organizations, 
which seek to lobby them and must understand their inner workings to do so 
effectively. This helps to create a positive feedback loop thatgenerally serves to 
improve the supranational organization in the long run. Two excellent examples 
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of this are the World Bank and the IMF, both of which provide professional 
expertise to client countries in addition to loans. 
Economies of scale 
Supranational organizations often benefit from economies of scale, whèreas for 
nation-states there is usually no direct link between public goods and population 
size. Donald Wittman (1991: 126) writes, "Economies of scale and scope are two 
basic explanations for the size and scope of nations. The costs of administration 
and policy coordination are unlikely to be proportional to the size of the polit y." 
When supranational organizations focus on one or a handful of items, it allows 
them to leverage those economies of scale to provide a public good for less cost, 
and at a higher quality, than what any individual member could afford or achieve 
on its own. An example of this is the EU with its large internai market and 
directives designed to spur common markets in various goods and services, the 
most recent of which is the Markets in Financiallnstruments Directive (MiFID). 
Hubris 1 empire building 
However, when they do not restrict themselves to a pre-defined set of public 
good provision activities, supranational organizations can become prone to 
hubris or empire building leading to a form of 'agency problem'. (Earlier, we 
described this as supranational entrepreneurship.) An important consideration is 
voting rules, which impact the extent to which an organization's scope can 
change over time and how dissenting member countries will respond to it, 
whether by deciding to walk away orto stick around-assuming that the whole is 
worth morethan the parts. 
As an example of empire-building, one need only look at the scale and scope of 
the activities of the European Union after 50 years of operations to see that the 
sectors where it is active today are quite different than those originally envisioned 
by the Treaty of Rome. Subsequent EU treaty efforts, in particular the failed 2004 
constitutional treaty, represented in some ways an effort to catch up with the 
'facts on the ground', many of which resulted from an especially wide 
interpretation of the EU's role by members of the European Commission or by 
various judgments handed down from the European Court of Justice. 
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Financial costs 
We distinguish two situations regarding pot'ential growth ove!- time in the 
financial costs associated with a supranational organization. The first one is when 
a member's annual contributions are based on factors such as national GOP as a 
percentage of world GOpxxxvi in which case annual contributions would grow in 
relation to economic growth, inflation, or some other factor that affects the 
organization's operating costs, but at the sa me rate as those of other members. 
The second situation, and the one that we are focusing on here, is the possibility 
that membership contributions increase as a result of 'scope creep', essentially 
the result of an agency problem. This is in some ways what caused the United 
States to hold off on contributions to the United Nations in the 1980s and 1990s 
on the premise that the UN was exceeding its mandate (a form of the '1 didn't 
vote for that, so why should 1 pay for it' argument.) Another example is the 
famous 'rebate' negotiated by Margaret Thatcher in April 1980, which saw a 
portion of Britain's EU membership contribution (based on a percentage of GOP) 
refunded on the basis that to do otherwise would have left Britain as a net 
contributorXxxvii to the Union during a period when it could theoretically least-
afford it. 
Ability to blame 
Supranational organizations play two very important political roles relative to the 
domestic political scene of a nation-state. On the one hand, they provide a 
convenient outlet to blame when they undertake policies that go directly against 
the populist prerogatives of a state's ruling government or the policies of the 
party / parties in opposition. A EU white paper on governance highlights this 
issue: 
"Where the Union does act effectively, it rarely gets proper credit for 
its actions. People do not see that improvements in their rights and 
quality of life actually come from European rather than national 
decisions. But at the same time, they expect the Union to act as 
effectively and visibly as their national governments." (CEC 2001:7) 
One example is the always-unpopular requirement to cut expenditures or raise 
taxes to comply with the EU Stability Pact's requirement for fiscal responsibility or 
the need to change work rules in the face of directives from the European 
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Commission or a decision handed down by the European Court of Justice. On the 
other side of the Atlantic, the politically costly 2002 decision by the US 
government to suspend a series of protectionist measures that were in clear 
violation of WTO rules was justified on the basis that the US had no choice but to 
suspend the protections or face a punitive trade war with the EU. 
Supranational organizations also act as agents of change providing a measure of 
political cover for policies that, while in the long-term interest of the 5tate and 
recognized as such by the central government, are too politically unpalatable to 
be pursued by the party in power or the opposition. The process of passing into 
national law the acquis communautaire of the European Union by candidate 
countries, thus overriding longstanding domestic policy preferences, is one 
example of this. 
Dual loyalties 
ln general, supranational organizations are not explicitly designed to dual 
loyalties among their constituents' citizens. They are I..Isl..lally only active on one or 
a handful of levels, and so are limited in the ways in which they influence the 
day-to-day lives of citizens. The clear exception to this though is the EU, which 
has sought to some degree to develop a second, parallel loyalty among its 
citizens. There are two reasons for this. The first is to address the perceived 
democratic deficit associated with the EU, which has given itself broad powers to 
affect the lives of ail citizens at work, at home and on the move. The EU did so in 
large part without consulting citizen s, through a process of growth by stealth (see 
the earlier discussion on supranational entrepreneurship). There is a fear that one 
day the citizens of the EU will 'wake up' and seriously question the arrangement. 
The second reason the EU seeks to foster a sense of belonging on the European 
level among the citizens of EU member states is to provide political cover for it in 
its dealings with member states, providing it with a legitimacy that it otherwise 
lacks. 
As an example of this desire to foster a dual loyalty, in its 2001 White Paper on 
Governance, the European Commission put forth the following rationale for 
reforming its governance mechanisms: 
"There is a perceived inability of the Union to act effectively where a 
clear case exists, for instance, unemployment, food safety scares, 
crime, the conflicts on the EU's borders and its role in the world." 
(CEC 2001:7) 
"Where the Union does act effectively, it rarely gets proper credit for 
its actions. People do not see that improvements in their rights and 
quality of life actually come from European rather than national 
decisions. But at the same time, they expect the Union to act as 
effectively and visibly as their national governments." (CEC 2001:7) 
"By the same token, Member States do not communicate weil about 
what the Union is doing and what they are doing in the Union. 
"Brussels" is too easily blamed by Member States for difficult 
decisions that they themselves have agreed or even requested."-
(CEC 2001:7) 
Ability to control 
65 
The ability to control the actions and outcomes of a supranational organization 
are de'termined by two factors. The first factor, and the only formai one, is the 
type of voting rules in effect. Depending on the organization and the question to 
be determined, voting rules can range from simple majority to various forms of 
qualified majority to unanimity. However, it is the informai unwritten rules~the 
geopolitical realities-that often determine how those formai rules are applied. 
The threat of retaliation outside of the organization on other matters of 
importance to a given nation-state, or conversely, the ability to make side 
payments provide an indirect measure of control over an organization's member 
states and thus the organization itself. Depending upon the organization and the 
nation-state (e.g., the UN and the US), the threat to quite simply leave the 
organization may be enough for a nation-state to have its way. However the 
overall ability to control the actions of a supranational organization will most 
always depend on the dyad of nation-state and organization. Venezuela's threat 
in the fall 2007 to leave the World Bank and the IMF has not impaired the ability 
of either of those organizations to continue with their mandates. 
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Sub-national entities 
Technical expertise 
On the question of technical expertise, what sub-national entities lack in pure 
theoretical expertise, they usually make up for in terms of local, on-the-ground 
knowledge. They can harness relationships and shared histories, which can 
ultimately make them more effective in the execution of the provision of public 
goods (if not the initial quality of their conception). The fact that sub-national 
entities are even closer-relative to national governments-to the ultimate 
consumers of public goods may give them a qualitative edge in the ways that 
matter most, at least that is the argument behind Tiebout and decentralization. 
Economies of scale 
However on the question of economies of scale, the shift to sub-national entities 
likely removes any economies of scale. In fact, a sub-national government such 
as a province or an American state must often manage a series of competing-if 
not outright conflicting-priorities, without a corresponding increase in resources 
available. One exception to this is if the provision of the public good is shifted to 
a specialized public agency that may be in a position to focus ail of its efforts to 
the provision of that publie good. 
Hubris / empire building 
Regarding the possibility of hubris or scope creep, it is definitely more likely at 
thelevel of sub-national entities. Lacking the geographical distance between the 
people who conceive of and deliver public goods and those who consume them, 
there is significantly more potential for hubris or empire building to occur, a key 
risk common to principal-agent relationships. 
Financial costs 
On the question of financial costs, the option of turning to a sub-national entity 
is the one alternative most likely to result in an increasing financial commitment 
over time, even to the point of becoming a bottomless hole. This is due in part to 
an agency problem created by the fact that the actor that pays for the provision 
of public goods (the State) is not the same as the actor that provides them (the 
sub-national entity). The sub-national entity, already benefiting in the mind of 
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the public from the positive association created from delivering the goods to the 
population has an incentive to essentially 'gold plate' the offering, then turn to 
the 'State to ask for more resources. When the State initially refuses, it is the 
State-and not the sub-national entity-that is portrayed as the' bad guy in the 
minds of the local population. On the coritrary, the sub-national entity comes off 
as the 'only' one that has the needs of the local population at heart. Recent years 
have seen this scenario play over and over again in Canada where, once the 'fiscal 
imbalance'-a potentially spurious concept-was corrected, the provinces found 
additional reasons to demand federal monies for activities that, under the 
Canadian constitution, were officially theirs and theirs alone to manage (e.g., 
healthcare, education). 
Ability to blame 
Among non-state actors, sub-national entities are the most difficult to work with 
when the situation sours. Inasmuch as they employ members of the same 
national population and-at least on paper-share the sarile motives as the State 
(i.e., to provide public goods to the benefit of citizenry), they do not make an 
easy target for blame. Indeed, because they are doser to the local population and 
by the same token, they provide the public goods-meaning they are more easily 
identified with any benefits-sub-national entities hold the upper hand in terms 
of any publie debate between them and the State. The ability to play the 
population off against a sub-national entity can be particularly problematic when 
that sub-national entity, such as a provincial government, represents a specifie 
ethnie or cultural group, as in Québec or Catalonia. The situation can quickly 
become explosive as any accusation can rapidly take on an 'us versus them' angle 
to the usual detriment of the State. 
Dual loyalties 
It is on the question of dual loyalties that the most scope for trouble exists, 
particularly if it is a sub-national government of the next level down representing 
a culturally, linguistically or ethnically distinct region. Again, due to the nature of 
the devolution of provision of public goods-the sub-national entity is front and 
center in the minds of the consumers of those goods-the population is more 
likely to view the sub-national government as relevant to their lives. As with the 
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question of the ability to blame or play one actor off against another, providing 
additional visibility to a sub-national government that represents a cultural or 
ethnie group can lead to the creation or reinforcement of dual loyalties. This is 
particularly the case in independence-minded regions like Québec or Catalonia 
that have already secured sorne measure of autonomy. Each additional public 
good that they are tasked with providing further contributes to their 'critical 
mass' in the minds of their constituents. The ability to demonstrate that they can 
successfully provision a series of goods over time provides a powerful argument 
for those forces wanting to take the final remaining steps along the path of self-
determination. 
Ability to control· 
One could think that control of the purse strings is a sufficient condition for 
maintaining control over a party to whom publie goods provision has been 
delegated. However, the ability to control sub-national actors is made difficult by 
the issues of blame and dual loyalties described above, irrespective of whether 
the state is providing the funding or not. Inasmuch as the actor in question is a 
task- or domain-specifie agency as opposed to a local or regional government 
representing a specifie cultural or ethnie group, the ability to control will be 
enhanced, though still not as straightforward as with a private actor or a 
supranational organization. 
Private acta rs 
Technical expertise 
As they gain in scale and scope, private actors may come to resemble 
supranational organizations over time in their level of technical expertise, with 
professional managers from multi-national backgrounds focused on one or more 
publie goods that will then be provisioned across multiple countries. Discussing 
the case of water services and waste management providers that were initially 
focused on domestic needs in their native France, Marc L'Aimé (2005) discusses 
the potential for growth in private actor scope in Le Monde Diplomatique. 
"THREE of the four leading world water companies are French: Veolia, 
formerly Vivendi, is an offshoot of the Générale des Eaux, founded 
in 1853; Ondeo is a subsidiary of Suez-Lyonnaise, founded in 1880; 
and Saur belonged to the Bouygues group until November 2004'. 
The~e are the 'three sisters'. 
"In less than 20 years they have become top players. Ondeo is the 
global No 1 in numbers of people served (125 million worldwide). 
Veolia Water, with 110 million clients, cornes in second globally and 
first in France, where it provides 26 million people with drinking 
water and 19 million with sanitation ... 
"The three sisters control 40% of the global private-sector water 
market in more than 100 countries. Their only real competitor holds 
third position globally: RWE, the German energy giant, and its British 
subsidiary Thames Water, have managed to gain a foothold in the 
US market through their acquisition of the national leader, American 
Water Works."xxxviii 
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As they grow over time, private actors usually develop a high-Ievel of domain-
specifie expertise, though it is usually put to the task of ensuring profitability as 
opposed to the more philosophical ends one may find with sorne supranational 
organizations (e.g., UNHRC, UNESCO). This is due in part to the nature of their 
operations, which are often regulated through formai mechanisms that limit the 
priees that can be charged or the profits that can be made. The ability of private 
actors to pay greater than the market rate for talent, while providing the 
international opportunities commensurate with working for supranational 
organizations, may actually leave them in a better position to attract expertise 
than sorne supranational bodies cano However, this development of technical 
expertise may, over time, become problematic as weil. Describing the challenges 
facing municipal officiais in France in their relations with the three large water 
services companies, Laimé (2005) writes that local water authorities, 
" ... are faced with the exponential growth of the big firms' 
knowledge in technical matters'-exploitation of water resources, 
research, administration, management, finances and client relations. 
An isolated local authority, without the necessary technical and 
human resources, is faced with an oligopoly-an unequal balance of 
powe r. "xxxix 
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Economies of scale 
As we saw with the three French water services companies, the ability of private 
actors to grow outside of their original geography over time, or to take on the 
provision of additional public goods for a given area, enables them to develop 
additional economies of scale. Private actors, while profit-oriented, are 
potentially more focused on the long term than their more political cousins-sub-
national governments-which are more likely concerned with issues of political 
expediency, a function of the electoral cycle and its often perverse incentives. 
Hubris / empire building 
The profit motive also limits the scope for pure hubris or empire building on 
behalf of private actors, at least for those publicly-traded companiesxl operating 
in developed countries with strong institutions that protect against corruption, as 
weil as mature capital markets where shareholder rights are enforced. Market 
discipline of this nature eventually forces private actors such as publicly listed 
companies to focus on opportunities that will help to grow profits as opposed to 
just growth for its own sake. One need only look back to the disappearance of 
many of the conglomerates built during the 1960s and 1970s as described in 
Chapter 2 to appreciate that the market is quite happy and ableto diversify on its 
own. However, the need for profit means that private actors are much more 
sensitive to political risk, as demonstrated during the 2001 Argentinean debt 
crisisxli , whieh eventually saw the end of parity with the US dollar, freezes in the 
priees for most goods, and the forced conversion of ail outstanding dollar debt to 
denomination in pesos. 
Recourse is essentially a choice between walking away or pursuing the matter via 
the legal system, which in many developing countries is highly exposed to the 
same political logic that led to the dispute. As an example, in 2003, Veolia 
announced that it was considering abandoning its water management concession 
in the Argentinean state of Catamarca in the face of massive refusai by citizens to 
pay their water bills xlii • In August 2007, Vivendi won a $105M awardxliii from the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes against the 
Argentinean state of Tucuman after a 10-year battle following Tucuman's 
unilateral modification of the terms of a 30-year concession. 
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Financial costs 
The profit motive that drives many private actors can also lead to potential cost 
creep. However, as indicated above, private actors are often limited in the priees 
that they can charge or the profits that can be made, wh ich can provide an 
effective cap on the relative co st of the publie good. The profit motive also 
favours the search for productivity and innovation to reduce expenses, which 
should result in improved outcomes for citizens and the other entities paying the 
bills. Public opinion also provides an often-effective counterweight as witnessed 
by the travails of European and North American public utilities firms in South 
America. 
Ability to blame 
Like supranational organizations, private actors can be easily blamed in times of 
relative or general difficulty, with accusations of betrayal of the nation and its 
interests a particularly powerful means of modifying behaviours. This becomes 
even easier when the private actor in question is a multinational corporation, like 
one of the French water service companies described earlier. 
Dual loyalties 
At the level of the citizenry, the issue of dual loyalties is definitely not as 
pronounced with private actors as it is with supranational organizations-the 
European Union being the extreme example-or with sub-national entities such 
as provincial or state governments. Though there is the possibility of an agency 
problem-citizens as shareholders-the dispersion of shareholdings and the 
relative size of any given individual shareholder compared to the rest means that 
this is not normally problematic in the long run. Outsourcing the provision of a 
public good to a private actor has the advantage of marrying a publie political 
need with an actor that is essentially economic in nature. 
Ability to control 
One of the downsides of delegation to a private actor is the lack of direct control 
available to the same extent as when activities are managed internally. However, 
there are a number of measures available to the State to compensate for this. In 
the first place, measures to ensure minimum service levels as weil as maximum 
pricing and profitability can be put in place to provide a minimum of oversight. 
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(Many countries beefed up their national regulatory frameworks and enforcement 
in the wake of privatizations to compensate for this lack of direct control; in fact, 
it was often part of the political price to be paid for privatizations to go forward.) 
Failing a satisfactory outcome through the application of regulatory prerogatives, 
the State can in most cases revoke the delegation of public goods provision-
though most often some form of compensation for owners is required in return, 
often as the result of arbitration. 
However, in the absence of performance measures and enforced guidelines, a 
private actor can pursue destructive behaviours that leave the nation-state on the 
hook. A particularly telling example of this comes from Iraq where the US 
government had pursued a poliey of extensive outsourcing of security to private 
military contractors. John Broder (2007) reports in a New York Times article on 
the implications to the State when things go wrong: 
"The State Department, seeking to retain its relationship with 
Blackwater USA while trying to bring the company's armed guards 
under tighter control, said Friday that it would now send its own 
personnel as monitors on ail Blackwater security convoys in and 
around Baghdad ..... Blackwater is one of three private companies 
providing security services to the State Department in Iraq, running 
heavily-armed escorts every time a prominent American civilian 
leaves the protected Green Zone .... The State Department measures 
announced on Friday are the first concrete response by the 
American government to the violent episode on Sept. 16 in central 
Baghdad involving several Blackwater teams that left as many as 17 
Iraqis dead." 
Optin1izing utility 
The potential to cali on multiple providers and types of providers as weil as the 
ability to compare and analyze them both quantitatively and qualitatively together 
provide the ability to evaluate the benefits of a given course of outsourcing on a 
rational choice basis. While the specifie financial costs associated with a given 
course of action are beyond the scope of this document, Table V lists the criteria 
that can be used to determine the qualitative desirability of engaging a non-state 
actor for the provision of public goods. 
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A rational choice evaluation of the set of public goods to be provisioned would be 
based on a simple cost-benefit analysis to achieve maximum utility~ This utility is 
the net difference between the benefits of outsourcing the provision of a public 
good (access to technical expertise, economies of scale, ability to blame, 
geographical scope, ability to control) and the potential costs (empire-building by 
the non-state actor, increasing financial cost, and dual loyalties) of doing so. 
Maximum utility can be achieved via one of two ways. Assuming a given level of 
economic expenditure, a rational state actor would first choose a combination of 
public goods provided by non-state actors that allowed it to maximize its utility-
the greatest positive difference (or smallest negative difference) between benefits 
and costs. The alternative approach is to choose a given level of utility and then 
select the combination of non-state actors and the requisite economic 
expenditures that would enable the State to achieve that utility. 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, the actor-type choices that 
should maximize utility from the perspective of the nation-state (again taking 
coordination costs as a given and according to the evaluation criteria and 
discussion in the previous section) are highlighted with a grey background. 
Table V: Maximum utility for outsourcing public goods provision 
Criteria Supra- Sub- Private 
national national actor 
• Technical expertise Yes No Depends 
Economies of scale Yes No Yes 
Hubris / empire building Depends Yes No 
Increasing financial cost Depends Yes No 
Ability to blame / provide Yes No 'Yes cover , ,,' ~ . , 
" 
Yes Yes No 
Ability to control Depends Depends . .: 'Yes 
Ranked order of preference 2nd 3rd pt 
A simple analysis of the preferred choices for the provision of goods-achieved 
by calculating the total number of optimal criteria per actor type (indicated by the 
shaded cells)-suggests that private actors would be the preferred vectors for 
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outsourcing public goods provision, followed by supra-national organizations. 
Delegation to sub-national government entities would appear to be fraught with 
challenges or negative externalities particularly when outsourcing to a sub-
national entity representing a distinct regional, ethnie or cultural group. 
Conclusion 
Combining the information provided in Tables III, IV, and V gives us a list of the 
public goods that can be provided, the various potential providers that combine 
to form a market for governance, the criteria with which to evaluate these 
providers, as weil as normative suggestions on preferred alternatives. Taken 
together, these form a rational choice-based framework for the provision of 
publie goods. 
Our analysis suggests that for a given state considering a Tiebout-style 
decentralization, private actors are the preferred vectors for outsourcing public 
goods provision. In effect, while not calling into question the collective qualities 
of these goods (e.g., non-rivalrous consumption, etc.), our analysis shows that 
certain publie goods respond better to market imperatives such as priee or 
profitability and are best delivered by the marketplace, even if they contain 
properties of collective goods. 
ln the next chapter, we shall examine the cases of three nation-states-Canada, 
the United Kingdom and France-on the assumption that rational choice was 
operated during the process of delegating publie goods provision. We will use our 
framework to determine the level of current optimality of outsourcing in those 
three countries as weil as make sorne suggestions regarding possible future 
decisions to outsource, as weil as potential improvements to current 
arrangements. 
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Chapter 4: Applying the framework 
With our framework for outsourcing the provision of public goods firmly in hand, 
we now move to the task of applying it to the real world. 
Our framework allows us to do a number of things. First it enables us to quantify 
current outsourcing efforts. To do so, we developed a table listing public goods 
and the different actor types, including the State (see Table Illon page 65). By 
checking off the intersections between public good and actor type, we can rapidly 
understand the scope and nature of public goods outsourcing for a given country. 
We then reprise the table with the names of the actors in question. 
Second, leveraging the baseline set by the preferred choices of actor type as 
identified in Table V, our framework enables us to comment on the qualitative 
optimality or sub-optimality of current outsourcing arrangements for a given 
state. We do so by superimposing the choices for a given nation-state overtop of 
those choices we designated as optimal in Table V. The intersection of a given 
state's choice of actor with our own preferred result suggests optimality-in the 
context of our framework alone-in that area. The absence of a state's choice for 
a given preferred result suggests the opposite: sub-optimality. 
Finally, this framework enables us to more easily compare outsourcing efforts 
across countries. This is possible both with an eye to the scope and nature of a 
given nation-state's outsourcing efforts, as described in our first finding. It also 
possible with respect to the optimality or sub-optimality as described in finding 
#2 in the previous paragraph. 
To that effect, we will first explore the case of Canada before moving on to 
consider the United Kingdom and then France. Though both members of the 
European Union, these last two countries are of particular interest because they 
differ in their adoption of the various foundational agreements of the Union in 
very important ways. In addition, they were both more than nominally centralized 
states as recently as ten years ago. We shall elaborate more on both points later 
in this section. We seek to compare Canada to the UK to bring out the differences 
76 
between two countries that practice Anglo-Saxon style capitalism and share other 
institutional similarities. 
Current outsourcing efforts 
Canada 
Table VI provides an overview of the current situation for public goods 
outsourcing in Canada, grouping any state-Ievel quangos and departments into 
the category of Nation-State. Table VII reprises the same information but with the 
names of the respective actors, including quangos where applicable. The names 
indicated there are for illustrative purposes and should not be considered an 
exhaustive list. For the sake of brevity, in sorne cases, we have been obliged to 
limit the number of actors mentioned, particularly in the case of sub-national 
entities and private actors. 
Table VI: Provision of public goods in Canada 
Public good Nation- Supra- Sub- Private State national national actor 
Agriculture / Fisheries and X X Oceans 
Auditor general X X 
Citizenship (passports, etc.) X 
Civil service X X 
Culture and X X 
communications 
Customs and Revenue X X 
Defence X X 
Education / Research X X 
Employment Insurance X X X 
Employment / labour force X X policy / training 
Enerqy policy X 
Environment X X 
Financial Oversight (Banks, 
stock markets, insurance X X 
companies) 
Foreign Affairs X 
Health X X X 
Homeland Security X 
Housing & Urban X Development 
Human Rights X X 
ImmÏ9ration X X 
Industrial Development 
(Export development / Farm X X 
Credit) 
Infrastructure X X X 
Interior X 
Lawmaking / justice / X X Tribunals 
Management & Budget X X 
Monetary policy X 
Natural Resource X X 
manaqement 
Postal Services X X 
Public utilities (Energy, X X Water) 
Reqional Development X X 
Social Programs X X 
Sport / youth X X 
Telecommunications X X 
Trade / commerce X X X 
Transportation X X X 
Veteran Affairs X 
Source: Government of Canada web site (www.canada.gc.ca). various 
provincial web sites. 
Table VII: Provision of public goods in Canada with actor names 
Public good Nation-State Supra- Sub- Private 
national national actor 
Agriculture 
Agriculture / and Agri-food Agriculture Canada; Fisheries and Canadian Food only; each Oceans Inspection province 
Agency 
Office of the 
Auditor general Auditor Provinces General of 
Canada 
Citizenship 
Citizenship and 
(passports, etc.) Immigration 
Canada 
Civil service Canada Public Provinces Service Agency 
Globemedia, 
Culture and Canadian Provinces Rogers 
communications Heritage, CBC Media, 
Quebecor 
Customs and CCRA Provinces Revenue 
Defence Department of NATO, 
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Defence NORAD 
Human 
Resources and Various Education / Social Provinces technical Research Development 
colleges (HRSD) (Ioans 
and grants) 
Employment HRSD Emploi Assurances Insurance Québec Desjardins 
Employment / 
labour force policy / HRSD Quebec* 
traininq 
Energy policy National Energy Board 
Environment Environment Provinces Canada 
Ontario 
Bank of Securities 
FinancialOversight Canada, Office Commission, 
(Banks, stock of the Autorité des 
markets, insurance Superintendent marches 
companies) of Financial financiers 
Institutions (Québec), 
etc. 
Department of 
Foreig n Affairs 
Foreign Affairs and 
International 
Trade (DFAIT) 
Health Health Canada WHO Provinces 
Homeland Security RCMP, CSIS 
Canada 
Mortgage and 
Housing & Urban Housing Provinces Development Corporation, 
Infrastructure 
Canada 
Canadian Quebec 
Human Rights Charter of Charter of 
Rights Rights 
Citizenship 
Immigration and Quebec* Immigration 
Canada 
Industrial Industry 
Development Canada, 
(Export Agriculture Provinces 
development / Farm Canada, Farm 
Credit) Credit Canada 
Highway 
Infrastructure 407Int'l, Infrastructure Canada Provinces Greater Toronto 
Airports 
Authority 
Ontario 
Provincial 
Interior RCMP Police, 
Sûreté du 
Québec 
Lawmaking / justice Department of Provinces / Tribunals Justice 
Management & Treasury Board Provinces Budget of Canada 
Monetary policy Bank of Canada 
Natural Resource Natural Resources Provinces 
management Canada 
Postal Services Canada Post IPU UPS, FedEx 
Public utilities Hydro- EPCOR, Nova Scotia (Energy, Water) Quebec Power 
Atlantic 
Regional Canada Provinces Development Opportunities 
Agency 
Social Programs HRSD Provinces 
Sport / youth Canadian Provinces Heritaqe 
Telecommunications SaskTel Bell, TELUS, MTS 
Trade / commerce DFAIT WTO, Provinces NAFTA 
Canadian 
Transportation 
Agency, CN, CP Rail, 
Trans portation Canadian Air Provinces Air Canada, 
Transport Wes1;Jet 
Security 
Authority 
Veteran Affairs Veterans Affairs Canada 
Note: * = deal specifically negotiated with Quebec 
Source: Government of Canada web site (www.canada.gc.ca). various 
provincial web sites. 
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ln the case of Canada, it quickly becomes apparent that the vector of choice is 
sub-national governments, specifically the ten provinces. This is essentially due 
to the country's constitutional arrangement as a confederation of constituent 
governments-four provinces initially, now ten in ail, as weil as three territories-
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and not to any recent effort to decentralize the country on the lines of fiscal or 
economic federalism. In fact, the political organization of the country preceded 
Tiebout's rationale for decentralization by almost a century. 
That Canada has outsourced any goods beyond sub-national actors is the result 
of its membership in various supranational organizations such as the WTO, 
NATO, and NAFTA to name but the most significant. After witnessing a long 
period of centralization following the country's founding in 1867-specifically in 
the case of monetary policy, utilities (such as power generation and 
transmission), rail transport, air transport, and telecommunications-an effort to 
decentralize was undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s in the context of important 
fiscal imbalances. These included the privatization of the national flag carrier, Air 
Canada; the privatization of the Canadian National railway; the sale of Telesat 
Canada to a private company; and the transfer of responsibility for airport 
services to community groups such as the Greater Toronto Airports Authority and 
the Calgary Airport Authority. There was additional privatization at the sub-
national level with provincially-owned telecommunications firms (Manitoba 
Telecom, Alberta Government Telephones) and electrical utilities (Nova Scotia 
Power and the former municipally-owned Edmonton Power (now EPCOR» 
becoming publicly-listed companies in the process.) 
However, there were some additional responsibilities delegated to the provinces 
over the past thirty years, ostensibly in the context of fiscal federalism, but in 
many cases the result of the province of Quebecx1iV , motivated by nationalist / 
self-determination forces, pushing for a special deal. The responsibilities that 
were transferred include the right to provide labour force training as weil as the 
selection of immigrants according to criteria specifie to Quebec. In practice, 
transfers of responsibilities are often in the form of an opt-out from a federal 
program with corresponding monies provided in their place to support the 
provincial version. 
United Kingdom 
Table VIII provides an overview of the situation of publie goods outsourcing in the 
United Kingdom, grouping any state-Ievel quangos and departments into the 
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category of Nation-State. Table IX (see page 80) reprises this same information 
but with the names of the respective actors, including quangos where applicable. 
Similar to the previous section on Canada, the names indicated here are for 
illustrative purposes and should not be considered an exhaustive Ii~t. 
Table VIII: Provision of public goods in the UK 
Public good Nation- Supra- Sub- Private State national national actor 
Agriculture / Fisheries and X X X Oceans 
Auditor general X X 
Citizenship (passports, etc.) X X 
Civil service X 
Culture and X X X 
communications 
Customs and Revenue X 
Defence X X 
Education / Research X X X 
Employment Insurance X X 
Employment / labour force X X policy / traininq 
Energy policy X X 
Environment X X X 
Fi nancial Oversig ht (Ban ks, 
stock markets, insurance X 
companies) 
Foreiqn Affairs X 
Health X X X 
Homeland Security X 
Housing & Urban X X Development 
Human Rights X X 
Immigration X X X 
Industrial Development 
(Export development / Farm· X X X 
Credit) 
Infrastructure X X X X 
Interior X X 
Lawmaking / justice / X X X Tribunals 
Management & Budqet X X 
Monetary policy X 
Natural Resource X X X 
manaqement 
Postal Services X 
Public utilities (Energy, X X Water) 
Regional Development X X X 
82 
Social Programs X X X 
Sport / youth X X 
Telecommunications X X 
Trade / commerce X X X 
Transportation X X X 
Veteran Affairs X 
Source: Government of United Kingdom (www.direct.gov.uk); The Scottish 
Government (www.scotland.gov.uk); Welsh Assembly Government 
(new.wales.gov.uk); Northern Ireland Executive 
(www.northernireland.gov.uk) 
Table IX: Provision of publie goods in the UK with actor names 
Publicgood Nation-State Supra- Sub- Private 
national national actor 
Department for 
Agriculture / Environment, Food and Rural Fisheries and Affairs, British EU X Oceans Waterways 
Board 
Audit 
Commission for 
Local Authorities 
Auditor general and the National X 
Health Service in 
England and 
Wales 
Citizenship Home Office, 
(passports, etc.) Identity and EU Passport Service 
Civil service UK Civil Service X 
Culture and Department for 
communications Culture, Media EU X 
and Sport, BBC 
Customs and HM Revenue & X Revenue Customs (HMRC) 
Defence Ministryof NATO, EU Defence 
Department for 
Education / Children, X X Research Schools and 
Families 
Employment Department for Work and X Insurance Pensions (DWP) 
Employment / Department for 
labour force policy / Work and X 
traininq Pensions (DWP) 
Energy policy X EU 
Environment Department for EU X 
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Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 
FinancialOversight Bank of England, 
(Banks, stock Financial 
markets, insurance Services 
companies) Authority 
ln the case 
of Northern 
Ireland and 
Fore ig n Affai rs Foreign Office North-South 
cooperation 
on the 
island. xlv 
Department of 
Health Health, National X X 
Health Service 
Homeland Security Home Office, MIS, MI6 
Housing & Urban X X Development 
Equality and 
Human Rights Human Rights X 
Commission 
Border and 
Immigration Immigration X X 
Agency 
Industrial 
Development 
(Export X X X 
development / Farm 
Credit) 
Infrastructure X X X X 
Interior Home Office X 
Lawmaking / justice X EU X / Tribunals 
Management & X X Budget 
Monetary policy Bank of England 
Natural Resource 
management X X X 
Postal Services X 
Public utilities X X (Energy, Water) 
Department for EU 
Regional Environment, (European 
Development Food and Rural Regional X 
Affairs Development Fund) 
Social Programs X X X 
Department for 
Sport / youth Culture, Media X 
and Sport 
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Telecommunications Office of X Communications 
Department for 
Business, Scottish Trade / commerce Enterprise and EU, WTO Executive Regulatory 
Reform 
Department for Virgin Transport, Transport Rail, Transportation British Scotland British Waterways Airways Board 
Veteran Affairs X 
Source: Government of United Kingdom (www.direct.gov.uk); The Scottish 
Government (www.scotland.gov.uk); Welsh Assembly Government 
(new.wales.gov.uk); Northern Ireland Executive 
(www.northernireland.gov.uk) 
ln a largely unitary state with a traditional weariness towards foreign 
entanglements-see Lord Salisbury's quip about Britain's "splendid isolation"xlvi in 
the 1890s-the governance of the United Kingdom has been seriously 
transformed within the past half-century. A quick glance at the results for the LlK 
shows mu ch more outsourcing of public goods at the supranational as weil as at 
the sub-national level, specifically at the level of the home countries. (In the 
context of England itself, the home country remains highly centralized, lacking in 
local representation and initiative to the same extent as in Canada or France). 
This transformation can be largely traced to two events: the country's 
membership in the European Economie Community in 1973 and the pro-active 
devolutionxlvii of a range of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the 
late 1990s. 
While the United Kingdom is a signatory to the Maastricht treaty of 1992, which 
would lead to the creation of a common European currency, the UK secured an 
opt-out that allowed it to keep the British Pound as it currency. As a result, the 
UK maintained control of its monetary policy following the formai introduction of 
the euro as a currency for transactions in 1999. In addition, the UK does not 
participate in the Schengen Agreement, which enables passport-free travel 
between member countries such as France, Germany, Belgium, etc., while also 
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largely eliminating customs controls specifically among EU member countries. As 
such it retains its prerogative in its decisions about customs. 
On the domestic front, home rule, as devolution is called in the UK, took effect in 
Scotland and Wales in 1998, following referendums in 1997. (lt was originally set 
for 1998 for Northern Ireland but only became fully operational in 2007 following 
a power-sharing agreement between the principal protagonists on the ground.) 
The range of powers devolved in the UK depends on the home country. The 
Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly, have primary legislative 
powers over many areas. This means that they can pass their own laws on topics 
such as education, which have been devolved from Westminster. However, the 
Welsh Assembly is limited to secondary legislative powers. It is only able to vary 
some laws set by the Houses of Parliament and only on those issues that have 
been devolved to Cardiff, the Welsh capital city. 
France 
Table X provides an overview of the situation of public goods outsourcing in 
France, grouping any state-Ievel quangos and departments into the category of 
Nation-State. Table XI (see next page) reprises this same information but with the 
names of the respective actors, including quangos where applicable. Similar to 
the previous sections on Canada and the UK, the names indicated here are for 
illustrative purposes and should not be considered an exhaustive list. 
Table X: Provision of public goods in France 
Public good Nation- Supra- Sub- Private State national national actor 
Agriculture 1 Fisheries and X X Oceans 
Auditor general X 
Citizenship (passports, etc.) X X 
Civil service X X 
Culture and X 
communications 
Customs and Revenue X X 
Defence X X 
Education 1 Research X X X 
Employment Insurance X X 
Employment 1 labour force X 
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policV 1 traininQ 
Energv pollcv X X 
Environment X X 
Financial Oversight (Banks, 
stock markets, insurance X X 
companies) 
Foreig n Affairs X X 
Health X X 
Homeland Securitv X X 
Housing & Urban X Development 
Human Rights X X 
Immigration X X 
Industrial Development 
(Export development 1 Farm X X 
Credit) 
Infrastructure X X X 
Interior X X 
Lawmaking 1 justice 1 X X Tribunals 
Management & Budget X 
Monetary poliev ' X 
Natural Resource X X 
manaQement 
Postal Services X 
Public utilities (Energy, X Water) 
Regional Development X X X 
Social Programs X X 
Sport 1 vouth X X 
Telecommunications X 
Trade 1 commerce X X 
Transportation X X X 
Veteran Affairs X 
Source: Government of France (www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr) 
Table XI: Provision of public goods in France with actor names 
Publie good ,. Supra- 1 Sub- Private national national actor 
Agriculture 1 Ministère de EU (Common 
Fisheries and l'Agriculture et de Agricultural 
Oceans la Pêche Policy) 
Auditor general X 
Ministère de 
Citizenship l'Immigration, de EU 
(passports, etc.) l'Intégration, de (Schengen) 
l'Identité 
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nationale et du 
Codéveloppement 
Ministère du 
Budget, des 22 Regions; 96 Civil service Comptes publics 
, départements' 
et de la Fonction 
publique 
Culture and Ministère de la 
communications Culture et de la Communication 
Ministère du 
Customs and Budget, des 
Revenue Comptes publics X 
et de la Fonction 
publique 
Defence Ministère de la NATO, EU Défense 
Ministère de 
l'Éducation Private 
Education / nationale; 22 Regions, 96 Schools Ministère de (elementary Research l'Enseig nement 'départements' to graduate 
supérieur et de la degree) 
Recherche 
Ministère du 
Employment Travail, des 96 Relations 'départements' Insurance 
sociales, et de la (RMI) 
Solidarité 
Ministère du 
Employment / Travail, des 
labour force policy / Relations 
training sociales, et de la 
Solidarité 
Energy policy X EU 
Environment X EU 
FinancialOversight 
(Banks, stock X European 
markets, insurance Central Bank 
companies) 
Ministère des 
Foreign Affairs affaires EU étrangères et 
européennes 
Ministère de la 
Health Sante, de la WTO Jeunesse et des 
Sports 
Homeland Security X EU (Schengen) 
Housing & Urban Ministère du Logement et de la Development Ville 
Human Rights X EU 
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Ministère de 
l'Immigration, de 
Immigration l'Intégration, de EU l'Identité (Schengen) 
nationale et du 
Codéveloppement 
Industrial 
Development 
(Export X X 
development 1 Farm 
Credit) 
Infrastructure X EU 22 Regions 
Ministère de 
l'Intérieur, de EU 
Interior l'Outre-mer et (Schengen, 
des Collectivités Europol) 
territoriales 
Lawmaking 1 justice Ministère de la Justice; EU / Tribunals Gendarmerie 
Ministère du 
Management & Budget, des 
Budget Comptes publics 
et de la Fonction 
publique 
Monetary policy European Central Bank 
Ministère de 
l'Ecologie, du 
Natural Resource Développe ment X 
management et de 
l'Aménagement 
durables 
Postal Services X 
Veolia, 
Ondeo, 
Public utilities Saur, Electricité (Energy, Water) de France, 
Gaz de 
France 
EU 
Regional (European X Regional X Development Development 
Fund) 
Social Proqrams X X 
Ministère de la 
Sport / youth Santé, de la X Jeunesse et des 
Sports 
France 
Telecommunications Telecom, 
SFR 
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Trade 1 commerce X EU WTO 
Transportation SNCF X 22 Regions 
Veteran Affairs X 
Source: Government of France (www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr) 
A quick glance at the results for France shows that outsourcing of public goods 
has essentially occurred at the supranational level, with some delegation-Iess 
than in Canada but more than in the UK-to the country's component regions or 
the private sector. At the supranational level, these changes can be largely traced 
to the country's role as a founding member European Coal and Steel Community 
of 1951 and the European Economie Community in 1957 as a signatory to the 
Treaty of Rome. France has since acted as a proponent for increased integration 
of members into the Union and as a consequence, has been a principal motor for 
the transfer of public goods provision to that entity. 
At the sub-national level, not much outsourcing has occurred to date in France's 
22 metropolitan regions, grouping 96 departments. Currently the regions are 
responsible for activities such as education, transportation, and infrastructurex'viii. 
They also levy their own distinct taxes, separate from the federal ones, and 
receive a portion of the federal budget. 
With respect to non-state actors, the situation is not clear-cut. With the exception 
of services like water distribution and local transportation, France has often been 
hostile to outsourcing to the private sector. In fact, until the election of French 
president Nicholas Sarkozy in 2007, the word privatization itself was somewhat 
taboo, lest the 'social contract' be upset. While some firms have been fully 
privatized, in many cases, the French state today either continues to control a 
majority of the share capital of a company or a large enough percentage, known 
as a "golden share', which enables it to continue to exert an outsized level of 
control relative to its holding. The line between quango, state-owned enterprise, 
and private actor in France is a fine one; one could have included man y of these 
nominally private actors in the category of nation-state. 
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Quality of effort 
We will now, use our framework to determine the optimality of current 
outsourcing efforts in the three countries by leveraging the baseline set in Table 
V of the last chapter. As we demonstrated in that table, according to our criteria, 
the preferred vectors for outsourcing the provision of public goods are private 
actors followed by supranational organizations, with sub-national entities firmly 
ensconced in third place in terms of desirability. 
Our qualification of the outsourcing situation of a given state is based on an 
initial high-Ievel appreciation of the dominant quality of the outsourcing dynamic. 
ln the following three tables (#XII, XIII, XIV), with one table corresponding to each 
country we have discussed, we have put an 'X' in the cell for each actor where we 
believe a given criteria is most dominant. We have also highlighted the preferred 
choices from Table V in lightgray in order to quickly bring attention to those 
areas where outsourcing for the country in question could be considered optimal 
or not. It is the intersection of an 'X' and a gray cell that indicates optimality for a 
given criteria. Sub-optimality is indicated where an 'X' occurs but the cell is not 
shaded. 
Canada 
Table XII: Evaluating arrangements for public goods provision in Canada 
Criteria Supra- Sub- Private Notes 
national national actor 
Technical expertise ,:";"X X WTO, BIS 
Economies of scale , X " , x, . ,"' \ . ' . ' 
" 
, , 
,,' Opt-outs for Hubris 1 empire building X ., " Quebec 
, , Discussion 
Increasing financial cost X about the 
" 'fiscal 
v imbalance' 
Ability to blame 1 provide X Opt-outs for 
cover Quebec 
Quebec 
Dual loyalties X " , separatism, 
Western 
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:; :: 
. :,' " Separatism. 
" >': 
,:' ,; 
" 
,:,',;,.'> Becomes too 
Ability to control X political, see 
" inability to >' '~ ", 
", 
. blame 
" 
ln the case of Canada, with the exception of access to technical expertise and 
economies of scale brought about by that country's participation in various 
supranational organizations and the important role of non-state private actors, 
the outsourcing of publie goods provision can be classified as sub-optimal. In 
fact only 3 out of a possible 9 areas can be described as optimal, with 6 items 
that are pointedly sub-optimal. With the exception of any activities managed by 
the central government or quangos, the country is essentially dependent on 
outsourcing to sub-national entities. As indicated earlier, this is largely due to the 
federal nature of the country, though sorne additional delegation has since 
occurred as a result of 'pulling' by provincial governments, with Quebec foremost 
among those doing the pulling. This reliance on sub-national entities has left the 
state exposed to hubris, scope creep and increasing financial costs. The 
particularly charged political dynamic, especially between Quebec and the federal 
government, precludes most attempts to lay the blame at the feet of the 
provinces, and obviates most opportunities for control, essentially leaving the 
federal government on the permanent defensive. 
United Kingdom 
Table XIII: Evaluating arrangements for public goods provision in the UK 
Criteria Supra- Sub- Private Notes 
national national actor 
EU; 
Technical expertise X X privatized 
utilities ' 
EU; 
Economies of scale X X privatized 
. , uti lities 
EU; home 
, countries Hubris 1 empire building X X post-
devolution 
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" 
< ' ;: ,1 1 EU; home 
'" 
,- countries Increasing financial cost X X ' ',~' post-p 
" 'Cl' devolution 
Ability to blame 1 provide 
>"" 6.~?\<?< 
' ,. 
EU coyer ,'. ~ 
Driven by 
. , 
devolution 
Dual loyalties X to Scotland, Wales; the 
" West Lothian 
Question 
Uncertainty 
about 
Ability to control X X further EU 
" integration; 
see Scottish 
" nationalism 
Overall, we consider the UK to be essentially sub-optimal, judging by the limited 
number of optimal areas (4 out of a possible 9) that overlap with our preferred 
choices from Table V. This is largely due to the high number of sub-optimal 
areas, specifically the strong presence of dual loyalties brought about by home 
rule for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, which has harmed the long-term 
position of the Union. 
Indeed the current situation in the LlK is judged by many to be untenable, 
specifically as a result of the way that publie goods provision has been 
outsourced. It has led to multiple resentments among the different home 
countries, over and above any historical grievances. A case in point is the 
availability of free university education and much more generous social programs 
in Scotland th an are available in England. This is made possible by a higher 
expenditure per person in Scotland than in England, even though ail funds are 
provided by Westminster. The Econornist describes the issue succinctly: 
"South of the border, English voters have started to notice that, 
though they continue to subsidise Scotland, they no longer have any 
say-through their MPs-over most of its affairs, even though 
Scottish MPs can, and sometimes do, provide the parliamentary 
majority for controversial measures that apply dnly in England. They 
notice, too, that Edinburgh has abolished tuition fees for Scottish 
university students, brought in free personal care for the elderly and 
soon, if [Scottish first minister Alex] Salmond gets his way (read, 
money), will provide free prescriptions and free school meals."xlix 
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It has given rise to a second more important challenge known as the 'West 
Lothian' question, "the constitutional anomaly that allows Scottish MPs to vote on 
laws affecting only England but, since devolution in 1999, denies English MPs a 
sayon a wide array of matters that pertain only to Scotland.'" At a minimum, the 
West Lothian question has led many to cali for home rule for England. Were that 
to occur, the role of Westminster and the future of the Union itself would be 
called into question. It is worth noting that the 'home countries' already have a 
certain amount of visibility on the international scene. A case in point is the 
football (soccer) World Cup where England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
compete against each other much as do France, Spain and Italy, for qualification 
and for victory.1i 
France 
Table XIV: Evaluating arrangements for public goods provision in France 
Criteria Supra- Sub- Private Notes 
national national actor 
See local 
difficulties 
Technical expertise X X with water 
services 
firms 
EU, water 
Economies of scale X X services 
firms 
Hubris / empire building X EU 
EU (new 
Increasing finapcial co st X entrants), 
etc.) 
Ability to blame / provide EU; Water X X services cover 
r firms 
Driven by 
the EU; 
Dual loyalties X X sorne 
regional 
loyalties 
EU w/ 
Ability to control X X X France as a 
motor of 
inteqration 
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Ove rail , the French situation is somewhat mixed, though better than in the UK, 
with optimality in six out of 9 possible areas. In terms of access to economies of 
scale and technical expertise. France benefits from its membership in the 
European Union in particular. On the other hand, it is France's membership of the 
EU that is also the source of hubris, dual loyalties (cultivated in part by the Union 
itself in a bid to address the perceived lack of legitimacy), and (relatively) 
increasing financial costs. 
The use of private actors such as the water services firms (Veolia et al) discussed 
earlier allows France to reap some of the benefits of outsourcing public goods 
provision, such as the ability to blame and the ability to provide political cover, 
with minimal downside. As indicated earlier, the geographical scope and scale of 
some actors, such as the three French water services firms with their worldwide 
operations, have left some managers of municipalities feeling that they are at a 
disadvantage. 
Comparison of outsourcing efforts across states 
Of the three countries we have surveyed here, it is France-traditionally a very 
centralized state-that has outsourced the most public goods in the most 
desirable manner, according to our evaluation criteria. The UK has outsourced a 
relatively similar number of goods, but they have for the most part been done in 
a sub-optimal way, leading to structural tensions in the Union. Finally, Canada 
has outsourced the least number of public goods and has been essentially sub-
optimal in the way that it has done 50. The result is al 50 structural tensions in the 
Canadian federation. 
Supranational organizations 
It is France's membership of the Schengen zone as weil as the Euro currency that 
provide the quantitative difference in supranational outsourcing when compared 
to that observed in the United Kingdom, a fellow member of the EU that has 
chosen to opt out of both efforts for now. Canada's membership of NAFTA do es 
not compare to the quality of public goods outsourcing undertaken by either 
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France or the UK in that NAFTA is limited uniquely to commercial activities and 
has not demonstrated the same sort of scope creep as witnessed with the EU. 
Sub-national entities 
Compared to the situation of France's 22 regions, the UK's devolution of powers 
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is much more important in scope with 
sizeable autonomy-both primary and secondary powers-in certain matters. 
However, when compared to Canada where such devolution of powers is 
enshrined in the constitution, with additional responsibilities and monies 
continuing to be transferred over time, the UK's approach largely pales in 
comparison. 
Private actors 
With respect to the role of non-state actors, their importance in France is uneven 
when compared to the situations in the UK and Canada. In fact, until as recently 
as the early 19805, the trend had been towards the centralization, or 
nationalization, of key industries. This effort was outlined in French President 
Mitterrand's '110 Propositions for France' and implemented in the law of 
nationalization 1ii of 1982. Watkins (2007) provides some insight on the scope of 
the undertaking: 
"The nationalizations of 1981-82 involved seven of the largest 
twenty conglomerate industrial companies in France plus another 
five industrial companies. Thirty six banks and two finance 
companies were also nationalized to be sure of the State having 
capital sources for the nationalized sectors."liii 
When privatization efforts did begin in France, they proceeded in fits and starts, 
often falling short of outright privatization for many companies. In many cases, 
the French state today either continues to control a majority of the share capital 
of a company or a large enough percentage, known as a 'golden share', which 
enables it to continue to exert an outsized level of control relative to its holding. 
As indicated earlier, there is a fine line between quangos and privatized firms in 
France. 
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ln contrast, privatizations of state-owned firms in Canada and the UK proceeded 
much more smoothly. In Canada, the state has largely relinquished its golden 
shares in state-owned firms such as Air Canada and Canadian National. The 
situation in the UK is even more fluid. There the government sees no issues with 
foreign firms purchasing domestic providers of water services and energy, 
preferring to let the market determine the best allocation of resources while 
ensuring desirable outcomes for consumers with a deft touch of regulation. 
Conclusion 
When applied to the workplace one approach of organizational management 
theory is to first define what 'success' would like and to then work backwards, 
determining the strategie choices and tactical actions required to achieve it. In the 
case of the nation-state, keeping coordination costs constant, success would look 
like a situation whereby publie goods provision was outsourced to the greatest 
extent possible-enabling the state to steer while leaving the rowing to others-
while maximizing the capture of ail positive externalities and minimizing any 
negative ones. 
Based on Table V from Chapter 3 and on our evaluation of the outsourcing 
situations in Canada, the UK, and France in Chapter 4, it would appear that where 
possible, aside from pursuing the option of quangos-they are outside of the 
scope of this discussion-states looking to achieve the benefits of fiscal 
federalism would find it advantageous to outsource public goods provision either 
to private actors or supranational organizations (in that order), avoiding sub-
national entities when possible. 
The first two actor types appear to offer relatively easier avenues for control and 
can make for convenient scapegoats in times of difficulty-being easily 
positioned as against national interests, which is a sure vote-getter-while 
avoiding issues such as dual loyalties in the process. The ability to control private 
actors (more) and supranational organizations (less) also addresses to a certain 
extent issues such as empire building and increasing financial cost. 
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Sub-national outsourcing is inherently political (i.e., the decision to provide which 
kind of public good), as it opens the debate on to more emotional and qualitative 
issues, and should likely be avoided wherever possible or practical. If the sub-
national entity, such as a regional government, corresponds to a specifie cultural 
identity like the Scots or the Quebecois, then public disputes become nasty and 
can create future troubles, possibly even accelerating any existing drive towards 
separation. 
For those states inclined to pursue the outsourcing of public goods provision, a 
principal advantage of outsourcing is that it offers the central government the 
ability to lock in, to a certain extent, a specifie vision of the country. This is 
particularly the case when outsourcing to certain kinds of supranational 
organizations, which offer the ability to subjugate national and sub-national 
institutions to the rules of the organization in question. This is something that 
the EU does very weil, and that NAFTA and the WTO do to a lesser extent. Hirst 
(2002:3) writes that, 
"States are increasingly embedded in larger entities to which they 
have ceded certain sovereign powers; for example, members of the 
WTO accept its adjudication over a wide range of trade-related 
matters that impinge on the scope of national policy, and the EU 
member states under the Single European Act acceptEU legislation 
in matters facilitating the single market as superior to those of their 
national legislatures and enforcible (sic) as such in their courts." 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion and future study 
Conclusion 
The role of the nation-state as the sole provider of publie goods has been 
challenged and transformed by a range of political, economic, social, and 
technological phenomena. In attempting to address these challenges, states have 
turned toward supranational organizations, sub-national governments, and 
private actors. 
However the consensus among observers is that the State has not acted with 
regard to the long-term strategie impact of its actions. In the aggregate, the 
outsourcing of publie goods provision has been mostly happenstance, driven 
more by political expediency than any long-term design. As we noted earlier, 
Bache and Flinders (2004:36) write that, "In the context of these developments, 
there has been little long-term strategie thinking regarding the steering capacity 
of the centre." 
It is the opportunity to establish a strategie approach to the outsourcing of public 
goods that provided the backdrop for this essay. To enable such an approach, we 
have sought to develop a framework that evaluates the extent to which nation-
states can outsource responsibility for the provision of publie goods while 
bringing a qualitative dimension as weil. 
At the conclusion of this effort, we have three findings that we believe go a long 
way towards enabling a more strategie approach to publie goods outsourcing. 
First, that it is possible to create a coherent framework that captures the various 
options for outsourcing publie goods provision. In the course of this document 
we identified three actor types: the nation-state (including quangos); 
supranational organizations; sub-national entities, and private actors. When 
combined with the State as publie goods consumer on behalf of citizens, we cali 
this a market for governance. 
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Second, with few exceptions, for any given public good-keeping in mind our 
caveat regarding geographical location as a filter for certain types of 
organization-we showed that there are multiple alternatives for outsourcing 
within a given actor type. 
Third, we demonstrated that a series of non-economic, non-financial criteria 
could be applied to enable a more strategic approach to the question of 
delegation of public goods provision. These are based on the notion of spillovers 
as weil as criteria from the world of principal-agent theory to generate a notion of 
utility, which, keeping coordination costs constant, can be maximized by either 
increasing the positive externalities of a given course of outsourcing or by 
reducing the negative externalities associated with it. 
Futu re study 
ln the course of undertaking this effort, a number of additional avenues for future 
study appeared. Sorne of them are due to the necessarily more limited scope and 
nature of an essay like this one. Others are the result of new questions thrown up 
by the work itself. None of them modify our initial hypothesis as such; instead 
they expand the qualitative applicability of the framework. 
Broader sam pie 
The first effort would be to expand the sam pie of countries to which we apply the 
framework. This should include countries that have not yet started down the path 
of outsourcing to any significant degree. For example, Serbia, a country that sits 
on the geographical and philosophical fault-line between the European Union, 
NATO, and the Russian sphere of influence cornes to mind. (In this case, we could 
make immediate recommendations on the best paths for moving forward.) It 
should also look at those countries that are actively considering new outsourcing 
opportunities, to complement existing arrangements. This brings to mind 
countries that are being asked to join Mercosur or ASEAN. Final/y, it should also 
be applied to countries that enjoy high degrees of outsourcing already such as 
the United States and Switzerland. 
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Optimalityand utility 
A second effort would be to further transform the criteria for evaluating the 
desirability of a given course of outsourcing action from a qualitative into a 
quantitative measure. The approach covered in Chapter 4, while highly subjective, 
represents a starting point nonetheless. In addition, it could be desirable to 
develop something along the lines of an optimal score. This would help us 
understand which countries are close enough to the optimal. Furthermore, the 
development of an outsourcing index, which would enable the ranking and 
comparison of countries' efforts, would further facilitate discussion and 
recommendations for the future. These suggestions would be further nuanced 
based on the level of centralization and ethnie make-up of a given nation-state. 
Role of quangos 
A third avenue would be to expand the framework to explore the question of 
quangos. As indicated earlier, for the purposes of this effort, we considered them 
to be part and parcel of the nation-state. However, in conceiving of the criteria 
for evaluating outsourcing efforts, and in examining the cases of the three 
countries studied here, it became apparent that quangos share a number of the 
benefits of other actors. In particular, that they can < provide possibly an even 
better solution to the need to address the dynamic of decentralization and fiscal 
federalism, while potentially avoiding many of the downsides of outsourcing, 
particularly those associated with sub-national actors. By integrating quangos 
into our framework, we can expand the discussion about the opportunities for 
steering and rowing, and their advantages, to the maximum possible. We expect 
that the ranked order of preferred actor-types-essentially vectors for 
outsourcing-would likely change with the introduction of quangos. 
Impact on self-determination movements 
Finally, the development of this framework took place in the context of an ove rail 
effort to understand the dynamics behind self-determination movements, 
specifically those in the West where inter-ethnie violence and post-colonial re-
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distributions of power are not the rule of the day. By understanding how the 
forces (described in Chapter 2) were affecting, indeed transforming, existing 
nation-states, we hoped to understand how they could also affect the creation of 
new states through a mechanism known as the secession calculus. 
It is our hypothesis, to be proven in a future effort, that the existence of this 
market for governance and the outsourcing of the nation-state that it makes 
possible, have modified the secession calculus significantly. Whereas many 
independence movements, have effectively hit a ceiling on the strength of 
appeals to nationalist logic alone-witness the declining support for separation in 
Quebec since the original referendum in 1980, not to mention the impact that a 
barely veiled threat to take away pensions had on popular support for 
independence-the existence of adynamie that could effectively modify the cost-
benefit analysis associated with separatism could significantly change separatist 
outcomes in the future. 
By potentially lowering the perceived costs of independence, outsourcing the 
provision of public goods-in particular to supranational organizations and 
private actors with limited required growth in the non-physical infrastructure-
should modify the secession calculus for a given people. As a result, it should 
lead to more attempts at independence, and logically, assuming a given rate of 
success, more new nation-states. (The heart of this dynamic is demonstrated by 
the far right column in Annex III.) 
At its most extreme version, the market for governance and the outsourcing of 
the nation-state enabled by it, would correspond to a vision of the Singaporean 
operating system where one just adds people, land and national resources. 
* * * * * 
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Annex 1: Growth in sub-national public entities in the 
United Kingdom 
Table XV: Quasi-autonomous public bodies created [in the UK] since May 
1997 
Policyarea Quasi-autonomous organization 
Regional Policy Regional Development Agencies, Regional 
Cultural Consortia, Regional Flood Defence 
Committees 
Local Government Standards Board for England 
Northern Ireland Parades Commission (N.I.), Sentence 
Review Commissioners (N.I.), Commission 
for Racial Equality (N.L), Human Rights 
Commission (N.I.) 
Regulation Postal Services Commission (POSTCOMM), 
Office of Communications (OFCOM), 
Gas and Electrieity Markets Authority, 
Consumer Council for Postal Services, Gas 
and Electricity Consumer Council, Statistics 
Commission, Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority 
Food Policy Food Standards Aqency 
Constitutional House of Lords Appointments 
Policy Commission, Electoral Commission, 
Commission for Judicial Appointments, 
Office of the Information Commissioner, 
Human Rights Commission 
Criminal/Legal Civil Justice Council, Sentencing Advisory 
Policy Panel, Sentencing Guidelines Council, Local 
Probation Boards, Legal Services 
Complaints Commissioner, Youth Justice 
Board, Criminal Records Bureau, 
Independent Police Complaints 
Commission, National Police Training and 
Development Authority (CENTREX), Assets 
Recovery Agency, Security Industry 
Authority, Serious Organised Crime 
Agency, Civil Nuclear Police Authority 
Industrial/ Low Pay Commission, Better Regulation 
Business Policy Task Force, Fair Trading Authority, Small 
Business Service, Ethnie Minority Business 
Forum, Nuclear Decommissioning 
Authority, Fuel Poverty Advisory Group, 
Independent Commission on Community 
Interest Companies, British Trade 
International, 1 nsolvency Practiees Council, 
Partnerships UK, Financial Reporting 
Council, Valuation Tribunal Service 
National Lottery Nationë;ll Lottery Commission, Big Lottery 
Fund 
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Transport Strategie Railway Authority, Commission 
for Integrated Transport, Independent 
Railway Industry Safety Body, Office of Rail 
Regulation 
griculture British Potato Council, Countryside Agency, 
Rural Payments AJlenc'l 
Economie Policy Competition Commis!!ion,.Financial 
Services Authority, Monetary Policy 
Committee, Statistics Commission, 
Independent Complaints Commissioner for 
the Financial Services Authority, 
Competition Service, Competition 
Commission Appeal Tribunal 
Social Policy New Deal Task Force, New Opportunities 
Fund, Race Relations Forum, Disability 
Rights Commission, Youth Justice Board, 
Pensions Compensation Board, 
Independent Pensions Commission, 
Community Forum, Children and Family 
Court Advisory and Support Service, 
Pensions Regulator, Office of the 
Children's Commissioner for England 
Education Qualifications and Curriculum Authority, 
General Teaching CoLincil for England, 
Learning and Skills Council, Medical 
Education Standards Board, SchooJs 
Funding Agency, University for Industry, 
Office of Fair Access, National College for 
School Leadership, Adult Learning 
Inspectorate, Office of the Independent 
Adjudicator, Sector Skills Development 
Agency, Independent Complaints 
Adjudicator for OFSTED, Partnerships for 
Schools 
Health Commission for Health Improvement, 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence, 
Independent Reconfiguration Panel, 
National Care Standards Commission, 
Health Development Agency, Foundation 
Trusts, Primary Care Groups/Trusts, 
Commission for HealthCare Audit and 
Inspection, Commission for Patient and 
Public Involvement in Health, General 
Social Care Council, Air Quality Expert 
Group, Patient Information Advisory 
Group, NHS Information Authority, 
National Patient Safety Agency, National 
TreatmentAgency, Retained Organs 
Commission, National Clinical Assessment 
Authority, Council. for the Regulation of 
Health Professionals, Council for the 
Quality of Health Care, NHS Information 
Standards Board, Medical Education 
Standards Board, Nursing and Midwifery 
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Council, Health Professions Council, Social 
Care Institute of Excellence, National 
Shared Standards Initiative, NHS UniverSity, 
NHS Bank, Commission for Social Care 
Inspection, Health Protection Agency, NHS 
Appointments Commission, Family Health 
Services Appeals Authority, Counter Fraud 
and Security Management Service, Office of 
the Independent Regulator for NHS 
Foundation Trusts, National Care 
Standards Commission, Commissioner for 
Social Care Inspection for England 
Security Office of Surveillance Commissioners, 
Security Vetting Appeals Panel, 
Interception of Communications 
Commissioner, Intelligence Services 
Commissioner,.1 nvestigatory Powers 
Tribunal Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission 
Genetics Human Genetics Commission, Agriculture 
and Environment Biotechnology 
Commission, Genetics and Insurance 
Committee, Committee on Novel Foods 
and Processes, Sustainable Development 
Commission, Distributed Generation 
Coordination Group 
Miscellaneous Statistics Commission, National Archives, 
Hunting Commission, Independent 
Football Commission, Spoilation Advisory 
Panel, Committee for Monitoring 
Agreements on Tobacco Advertising and 
Sponsorship, Consumer Council for Postal 
Services, Brownfield Land Assembly Trust 
Co., Commission for Architecture and the 
Built Environment (CABE), National 
Endowment for Science, Technology and 
the Arts (NESTA), Land Registration Rule 
Committee, Office of the PPP Arbiter UK 
Film Council, Arm's Length Management 
Organisations (ALMOs), Locallmprovement 
Finance Trusts (LIFTs), Public Interest 
Companies (CICs) 
Source: Flinders (2004:888-89) 
Sources: Better Regulation Task Force Independent Regulators (London: Cabinet 
Office, 2003); C. Skelcher and S. Weir, Advance of the Quango State (London: 
LGIU, 2001); HC 209 Quangos Sixth Reportby the Public Administration 
Committee, Session 1998/99, London: HMSO; HC 367 Mapping the Quango State 
Fifth Report of the Select Committee on Public Administration, Session 2000-
2001 (London: HMSO); Public Records Office (PROCAn; National Digital Archive of 
Datasets (NDAD); British Official Publications Collaborative Reader Information 
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Service (BOPCRIS); Social Science Information Gateway (SOSIG), Public Bodies 
1997-2003, www.polis.parliament.uk. 
Annex Il: Evolution of forms of governance 
Table XVI: Evolution of forms of governance over time 
Peace of 
Westphalia 
Interdependence 
Distributed 
Public 
Governance 
Multi-Level 
Governance 
Nation-State 
Supranational 
organization 
I\lation-State 
Supranational 
organization 
Sub-national 
entity 
Supranational 
organization 
Private actor 
Sub-national 
entity 
Nation-State 
Supranational 
organization 
Supranational 
organization 
Sub-national 
entity 
Supranational 
organization 
Sub-national 
entity 
Nation-State 
Supranational 
organization 
Nation-State 
Supranational 
organization 
Sub-national 
entity 
Supranational 
organization 
Private actor 
Sub-national 
entity 
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Development #1 
non-slale aclors 
willing 10 offer public 
goods 
driven by 
-"i:: .. "jM,"~,~----.~ ,n" ""','">~ 
membership in 
supranational 
organizations 
pressure by 
sub-national 
governments 
lobbying by 
private 
actors 
""",_" "-f~C"4;;','" 
:' 
leadlng to 
rational-choice 
selection of 
providers 
cost-benefit 
analysis 
on the basis of 
more utility 
for same 
expenditure 
or 
same utility 
for less 
expenditure 
~ : 
Development #2 
new division 
01 "labour" 
transformation of 
public goods into 
collective goods 
devolution of public 
goods production 
toward 
locallevel 
education, culture, 
social policy, health èare, 
labour policy, infrastructure 
privatisation of 
provision 01 
public goods 
prisons, PTT, PMe, 
infrastructure 
with the State retaining 
maintenance of 
remaining goods 
fiscal policy, loreign policy, 
immigration, environment, justice 
Development #3 
(future avenues of research) 
_"'~I lower perceived costs 
of independence 
more attempts 
at independence 
ln 
more new 
nation-states 
Endnotes 
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xx Alesina (2003:309) notes that the issue of appropriate market size is also a factor of the international trade regime in 
place and that free trade relieves sorne of the pressure for countries to be bigger. 
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national governments. 
xxii See http://www.ci-pinkerton.com/history.html 
xxiii See Wikipedia article on Pinkerton National Detective Agency. 
xxiv See "Privateers under fire", The Economist, September 20'b, 2007. 
xxv Even the second ment of troops to other countries in a non-combat role is a form of outsourcing of expertise by the 
ho st country (e.g., US Special Forces involved in Plan Colombia and Operation Endunng Freedom-Philippines). 
xxvi As they gain in scale and scope, private actors may come to resemble supranational organizationsover time, with 
professional managers from multiple national backgrounds, focused on one or more public goods that will then be 
provisioned across multiple countries. 
xxvii See Wikipedia article on Military-Industrial Complex. 
xxviii Commission of the European Communities, "European Governance: A White Paper", Brussels, 25.7.2001, 
document # COM(200 1) 428. 
xxix . See http://www.bramyquote.com/quoteslquotes/alalfredpsI194030.html 
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xxxviii See L'aimé (2005b). 
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xl Here we draw a distinction between gross profits and profitability, which is a relative measure that takes into account 
the capital deployed to achieve the results. The market rewards profitability more th an gross profits. 
xli See Wikipedia article on Argentine Economic Crisis (1999-2002). 
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xliv Many other provinces have been content to essentially free ride, letting Quebec do the heavy lifting while alienating 
many non-Quebeckers in the process, and sharing in the benefits of this decentralization by stealth. 
xlv See BBC article "A guide to devolved powers", Oecember 2, 1999. 
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1 See The Economist article, "The England Question". 
li A recent phenomenon of Scots cheering for any team playing against England has broken what was until now solidarity 
among 'home' countries, including the now independent Republic of lreland, irrespective of day-to-day concems. 
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